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Foreword
When the first freight trains with computer parts from China ar-
rived in Duisburg in 2012 and soon also in other European cit-
ies, it was hardly foreseeable which circles would be drawn by the 
stone thrown into the water. The rail links were one of the first 
"New Silk Roads" to become the sign of China's economic, domes-
tic and foreign policy known as the Belt and Road Initiative1 since 
President Xi Jinping took office. Packed in a historical-idealising 
gown, China is to once again take its claimed place with them as 
the central 'Middle Kingdom' and full-scale great power. The ma-
terial basis for this is the systematic expansion of the state capi-
talist model of development and order, which explicitly sees and 
offers itself as an alternative to the model of a neoliberal, Western 
democratic and liberal social order and its global governance. Is 
the dominance of the Anglo-European-centred paradigm of im-
proving the world now being replaced by a new perspective from 
Asia - and is the East Wind defeating the West Wind?
The circles have taken on enormous proportions in a very short 
time. The official government narrative, which is a mixture of 
sparse facts and a lot of PR, offers a broad and contradictory in-
terpretation scenario, as do the countless debates and attempts 
at classification in the media, science, business and national and 
international politics. At the same time, new questions and top-
ics are raised. B&R inspires discussions about a new phase of glo-
balisation and geopolitical reorganisation in a multipolar world 
order and at the same time gives it a focus on which it can work 
off. There has long been a competition for the hegemony to in-
terpret B&R. Since the motives, goals and contours of the strat-
egy are so vague and a lot of information is unreliable, everyone 
can paint their own picture. They range from fascination in view 
of the audacity of the "Great Plan", hopes for growth, prosperity 
1 Abbreviated BRI. Initially, an official name was also One Belt, One 
Road (OBOR). In the following, the abbreviation B&R is mostly used.
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and stability, to worries about a further dismantling of human 
rights and democracy, and to fears about intensified, even mil-
itary conflicts, nationalistically connotated Chinese dominance 
and loss of sovereignty.
Against the background of the description of the numerous fac-
ets of B&R, the book focuses on the possible impacts in the par-
ticipating countries and regions. The promises and expectations 
of a boost to development through further integration into a Chi-
na-oriented globalisation are countered by the foreseeable dif-
ficulties and contradictions. The Chinese initiators cannot de-
cide alone where the Silk Roads will ultimately lead. Success and 
profit, by the way also for China itself, depend on many factors 
and is therefore by no means decided. In the meantime, the con-
tours are becoming clearer. Concrete activities and effects become 
more visible. The analyses and valuations, which were initially of-
ten speculative, guided by vested interests or wait-and-see atti-
tudes, can increasingly be based on information and tangible re-
sults. However, any attempt to capture scale and implications in 
more than a snapshot is futile2. In any case, Sino capitalism is in 
a fast forward mode. The initiative will have far-reaching impli-
cations for both Asia and Europe and is already giving a new im-
petus to globalisation and the world order.
An important part of the preparatory work for this book was 
a project within the framework of the Stiftung Asienhaus China 
Programme3. My thanks therefore go to Nora Sausmikat, head of 
the programme, for her sense of having taken up the subject at 
an early stage. Most of the information, suggestions and assess-
ments come from a comprehensive analysis of newspaper, mag-
azine and blog texts, websites and the increasing flood of publi-
cations. Numerous discussions with Christoph Görg, Dominik 
Hofzumahaus and Armenui Carstensen have helped to focus on 
these issues. Korinna Horta, Sukhgerel Dugersuren, Au Loong 
2 The manuscript was completed at the end of April 2018 and up-
dated in October 2018.
3 See www.eu-china.net/belt-and-road-initiative and the brochures 
China-Programme et al (2017) and Stiftung Asienhaus (2017).
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Yu, Frans-Paul van der Putten and Wolfram Schaffar thankfully 
took the time to answer the long list of my questions and thus con-
tributed further important facets and assessments. By courtesy 
of Mercator Institute for China Studies I have been allowed to 
use an imprint of the Silk Road map. Special thanks go to Christa 
Wichterich, without whose support I would have been lost in the 
sea of contradictory information, assessments and sources. Dar-
ius Ibrahim translated this complex text thoroughly, speedily and 
competent for which I am very grateful to him. Bonn, October 2018



1. Introduction
“The Belt connects the land
The road moves on the sea
The promise that they hold
Is joint prosperity
We’re breaking barriers
We’re making history
The world we’re dreaming of
Starts with you and me.”
“When trade routes open up
That’s when the sharing starts
Resources changing hands
And shipping auto parts
Ideas start to flow
And friendship starts to form
Then things impossible
All become the norm.”
Singing children from different countries, mostly fair-skinned 
and blonde, "express their gratitude", it says theatrically in a You-
Tube video1, against the painted backdrop of high-speed trains 
and container ships, skylines and camels in colourful landscape. 
The refrain "The future is coming" sums up the advertising mes-
sage of the new Silk Roads: the expansion of trade routes creates 
prosperity and friendship - or: Another world is possible, with 
Chinese characteristics.
What is staged here as a child's play is not a specifically Chi-
nese strategy, but rather mainstream economic policy thinking, 
which regards large infrastructure projects as a major impetus for 
economic growth and prosperity. Under the keyword "Connectiv-
ity", transport links serve to expand transnational trade, the ef-
1 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=H6Adz_arAYE. Accessed on 
November 11, 2017. The production company Fuxing Road Studios in 
Beijing is considered to be very close to the government: https://en.wiki-
pedia.org/wiki/Studio_on_Fuxing_Road
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ficiency of value chains and increased investment. The transport 
connections form the economic muscle strands along which spe-
cial economic zones and development corridors are created. Pio-
neers of this strategy were the World Bank and the Asian Devel-
opment Bank (ADB), the World Economic Forum Davos and the 
G20, the group of the most important industrialised and emerg-
ing countries. Since the end of 2013, however, the idea has been 
perfected by China’s Belt&Road Initiative, more vividly and at-
tractively referred to as “New Silk Roads”. China's own upswing 
to become a global economic power seems to guarantee its suc-
cess, in which the expansion of infrastructure played a key role, 
according to the motto "If you want to get rich, build a road first".
Chongqing - Duisburg
According to the founding myth, however, it were initially other 
players who cleared the way. Ronald Kleijwegt, Global Logis-
tics Director of the HP technology group, claims paternity: " The 
Trans-Eurasian Railway was more or less my baby".2 The first test 
train already started in 2008 in Shenzhen, the Special Economic 
Zone near Hong Kong. The route initially ran through Mongolia, 
but later the logistics specialists latched directly into the Trans-Si-
berian Railway’s route further east. 
However, this route was unfavourable for production facilities 
in central China such as the up-and-coming Chongqing location, 
which benefited from the relocation of factories from the coastal 
regions to the interior of the country. Kleijwegt therefore looked 
for direct routes through Kazakhstan, the Ukraine, Slovakia and 
the Czech Republic or through Russia, Belarus and Poland. Nu-
merous difficulties and obstacles had to be removed along the 
way. One breakthrough was the formation of the Customs Un-
ion between Kazakhstan, Russia and Belarus in 2010, which was 
expanded and upgraded five years later to become the Eurasian 
2   Cited by Wade Shephard, How Those China-Europe 
'Silk Road' Trains First Began, June 29, 2016
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Economic Union (EAEU). This reduced bureaucracy, controls and 
thus the time required. In 2012, HP sent the first regular train on 
the route between Chongqing and Duisburg.
Since then, numerous Chinese cities with their own connec-
tions to Europe have been building the "Eurasian Land Bridge" 
with partner cities such as Warsaw, Lyon, Hamburg, Madrid, Lon-
don and Tilburg. On average, the journey takes two weeks and is 
twice as fast as the sea route, and substantial subsidies help to re-
duce costs. "Freight traffic on these routes is now almost as easy 
as sending a parcel with a local postal service," writes journalist 
Wade Shepard, who is keeping a close eye on developments. In-
itially, the trains often returned empty - a highly unsatisfactory 
economic and ecological load factor. By now, they bring, among 
other things, wine and champagne, cosmetics and jewellery to the 
newly rising Middle Kingdom.
„Belt“ and „Road“
In addition to the "Eurasian Land Bridge", the backbone of which 
are the trains from central China to Europe, other planned trans-
port links and economic corridors are emanating from China 
like the spokes of a wheel: through Pakistan to the Persian Gulf, 
through Myanmar and Bangladesh to India and to the Indian 
Ocean, through Southeast Asia to Singapore, through Mongolia 
to Siberia. Whereas China's own export-oriented economic devel-
opment initially took place in the south-eastern coastal regions 
around Shanghai, Shenzhen and Guangzhou as well as around 
Beijing and the port city of Tianjin, the provinces in the interior 
are now also looking for ways to the sea. Twenty years ago, with 
the introduction of the  "Go West" policy, the government started 
to develop, inter alia, Xinjiang in the west, Yunnan and Guangxi 
in the southwest, and Heilongjiang in the east through transport 
links, subsidies, and relocation of industries to reduce regional 
economic and social disparities. Now, with the new routes, they get 
access beyond the borders to sales markets and raw material sup-
pliers in Central Asia, the Middle East, Europe or Southeast Asia. 
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With their own investment projects on both sides of the bor-
der, these provinces in the Northwest, Southwest and Northeast 
are thus acting as bridgeheads for China's new, offensive neigh-
bourhood policy with the countries in the region (Godehardt 2014: 
25), in order to once again become a fully accepted great power 
on a global level. The expansion follows the pattern: The day be-
fore yesterday it was Shenzhen, yesterday Xinjiang, today Cen-
tral Asia, the Indian Ocean and Southeast Asia - and tomorrow? 
At the same time and parallel to the land routes, the so called 
"Belt", virtually all countries in East Asia, Southeast Asia, the 
Indian Ocean and East Africa are in the process of moderniz-
ing, planning or building ports, mostly with the help of Chinese 
funds and companies. The international sea routes through the 
Chinese Sea, the Strait of Malacca and the Indian Ocean to Eu-
rope, which Beijing has declared the "Maritime Silk Road of the 
21st Century", the "Road", are still those transport corridors that 
are used most intensively. The ports function as logistical hubs 
for maintaining ships, transporting goods to the hinterland and, 
conversely, threading products into global trade. 
Attempts to revive the idea of  the historic Silk Roads have been 
around for several decades. In 2011, the then US Secretary of State 
Hillary Clinton announced a new Silk Road to connect Afghan-
istan with its neighbours in order to advance the reconstruction 
of the country. But it remained an idea. Now it's China’s turn.
The path is created while walking
The response to the B&R initiative was tremendous. At the first 
summit meeting in May 2017, the Belt&Road Forum on Interna-
tional Cooperation in Beijing, nearly 30 heads of state partici-
pated, including Vladimir Putin, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, the Phil-
ippine President Rodrigo Duterte, Alexis Tsipras, Victor Orban 
and around five dozen other delegations. In addition to curios-
ity about the concrete contours and implications of the bold ideas 
proclaimed in Beijing and the fear of missing the train, China's 
announced contribution to financing also attracted attention: up 
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to a trillion US dollars are to be made available for implementa-
tion of B&R projects.3 With the Asian Infrastructure Investment 
Bank (AIIB), the Silk Road Fund and the New Development Bank 
of the BRICS states, alternatives to Western-dominated interna-
tional financial institutions such as the World Bank and the In-
ternational Monetary Fund (IMF) were created. 
Even five years after its launch by state and party leader Xi 
Jinping in autumn 2013, however, the venture still gives the im-
pression of a gigantic construction site: a maze of railway lines, 
container ports, terminals, economic zones, new border stations, 
pipelines and trunk roads, much of which only exists on paper. 
Highly symbolic was the huge model of a bridge that was set up at 
the summit meeting: Gold-plated and illuminated, it proclaimed 
a bright connection into the future – but the driveways were still 
missing. B&R is a collective name for a conglomerate of already 
existing, planned or even just envisioned projects for which the 
Chinese government is still seeking partners. The various maps 
that circulate are therefore rather sketchy. So far, at best, only 
the Chinese architects know the whole blueprint. As in the Asian 
board game Go, they occupy strategic points that can be expanded 
into fortresses or that encircle or distract opponents so that they 
cannot develop their own strategies. 
The official explanations and documents are often cloudy. They 
are limited to a few short „Vision papers“ and „Action plans“.4 All 
the more intensive is the official advertising at conferences, gov-
ernment meetings and in the official state media. The debates in 
scientific circles, at conferences, in media, economic forums and 
political discussions are also almost unmanageable. Since the 
tangible contours, intentions and goals are so fuzzy and reliable 
numbers and information are missing, polished or contradictory, 
3 Note: Costs and prices are expressed below in US dollar.
4 It was only in March 2015 that the National Development and Re-
form Commission (NDRC) presented a 15-page "Action Plan" that re-
mains very general and full of promises of mutual benefits and an 
equal, open partnership.
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everyone can paint their own image. In the process, three major 
explanatory approaches have emerged.
Geo-economics and geopolitics in the New Age of Globalisa-
tion
The official version of the Chinese government, which ties in with 
an ideal of the historic Silk Roads and is also adopted by nu-
merous participating governments and observers, sets its own 
development paradigm different from the Western development 
discourse. Declared goals are prosperity, economic growth and 
stability through connectivity and proactive State support. Con-
nectivity does not only encompass material infrastructure and 
trade, but also political cooperation, financial systems and "peo-
ple-to-people contacts". In response to the "weak recovery of the 
global economy, and complex international and regional situation" 
following the crises of the past decade (Vision and Actions docu-
ment, 2015), China will provide more public goods such as infra-
structure to the international community, Xi Jinping announced 
in a mission-conscious manner. The "new Golden Age of Globali-
zation" will differ from the previous neoliberal globalization of the 
past. This narrative is linked to an increasingly nationalist conno-
tation, the compensation of China’s humiliations by the colonial 
powers, and the restoration of its former significance, when the 
Chinese Empire considered itself the centre of the world. 
This official narrative "conveys a romantic picture of China's 
changing position in the world," says Xin Zhang of East China 
Normal University in Shanghai (2016). It emphasizes the spirit 
and legacy of the historic Silk Roads - connectedness, multi-level 
collaboration, a community of common interests, responsibil-
ity and destiny, linked by the hope that modern connectivity and 
trade routes can replace traditional power competition. A com-
mon development would benefit all participants in an open and 
inclusive way. To counter this basket of goodies, Western observ-
ers in particular then like to point to a decisive void in the para-
digm: Starting from the principle of non-interference in internal 
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affairs, there are no references to goals such as democracy, hu-
man and minority rights, institutional, legal and political reforms. 
A second explanatory approach focuses on the economic self-in-
terests of China. Accelerated by the financial crisis of 2007/2008, 
the Silk Road initiative represents an attempt to solve, above all, 
its own structural growth crisis, which is reflected in overcapac-
ities and declining growth rates, by further economic expansion 
and modernization. For Xin Zhang (2017), B&R is even the una-
voidable expansion of a "State capitalism", driven by the need for 
exploitation and accumulation and the striving for geo-economic 
hegemony, the expansion of China's position in the world. 
The third narrative focuses on geopolitical intentions. These 
are obvious in response to a possible containment of China by the 
US and it’s allies („Pivot to Asia“) and the concern about the se-
curity of its international supply routes, but are always denied in 
the official narrative.5 The feared spectrum of possible geopolit-
ical effects ranges from the emergence of vassal states and a new 
colonialism to the impending erosion of the Western-dominated 
world order and China's rise to an all-dominant hegemonic power. 
These expectations of shifts in the multipolar power structure are 
linked to various conflict scenarios, including a growing danger 
of military confrontation.
Construction sites on the Silk Roads
 
The stone, which Xi Jinping threw into the water five years ago, 
has been drawing ever larger circles since then. In the broad and 
multi-layered discussion, a multitude of topics and areas of con-
cern have emerged that are opened up by the initiative. They go 
far beyond the usual notion that B&R is primarily concerned with 
infrastructure projects, sales markets and commerce. 
5 At a press conference in March 2015 for example, Foreign Minister 
Wang Yi said, B&R „is a product of inclusive cooperation, not a tool of geo-
politics, and must not be viewed with the outdated Cold War mentality.“
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Chapter 2 addresses the crucial question of internal motiva-
tions and drivers shaping the initiative. Many contributions to 
the debate point to the need for the State to address the limita-
tions of the Chinese development model and its structural prob-
lems. But domestic political calculations such as securing power 
and legitimizing the Party and the State, and efforts to make up 
for the humiliations by the colonial powers in the 19th century 
also play a central role. In contrast to the catastrophically failed 
"Great Leap Forward" more than half a century ago, when Mao 
Zedong in an enormous feat of strength attempted to force the 
transformation of a peasant society into an industrialized soci-
ety, cutting short the transition to communism, the B&R initia-
tive now rather resembles more of a first "Great Step" on a „Long 
March“6, a planned and integrated expansion of "Socialism with 
Chinese characteristics". Thus it differs from Mao Zedong in its 
strategy, but not in its goals: National sovereignty, territorial in-
tegrity and the construction of a strong and prosperous nation 
that occupies its rightful place as a great power on the interna-
tional stage (Rolland 2017: 123). 
A core element of the new Silk Roads is infrastructure develop-
ment (Chapter 3). On the one hand, this is about providing other 
governments and countries with a lot of money to reduce the in-
frastructure deficit and improve connectivity as a prerequisite 
for investment, growth and prosperity. The construction of me-
ga-corridors creates new areas of globalization and economic ge-
ography, which can lead to an "infrastructure imperialism" by 
controlling important supply routes (Bach 2017; Reeves 2018). 
But experience also shows that large infrastructure projects in-
volve numerous social and ecological risks, which are also sys-
temic in B&R. Illustrated by the maritime Silk Road (Chapter 7) 
6 The Long March is a central heroic myth of the Chinese Communist 
Party (CCP). In the face of encirclement by Chiang Kai-shek's army, parts 
of the Red Army, later renamed the People's Liberation Army (PLA), and 
the party's leadership withdrew to the north-western Shaanxi Province. 
The retreat helped Chairman Mao Zedong consolidate and expand his 
power and prepared for the eventual victory over the Kuomintang and 
Japanese invaders (Source: Wikipedia, accessed June 4, 2018).
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it also could increase the risks of political conflicts with China's 
military presence in areas such as the Indian Ocean widening. 
Unlike in its own country, the Chinese government is depend-
ent on benevolent cooperation with other countries and regional 
powers. The decisive factors will therefore be how Russia, which 
itself pursues hegemonic claims in Eastern Europe and Central 
Asia (Chapter 4), India, which sees itself as a dominant power in 
the Indian Ocean and South Asia (Chapter 8), and Europe (Chap-
ter 10) react to the Chinese initiative. Are they competitors, even 
opponents or partners? A special situation arises in Southeast 
Asia (Chapter 6), where China already dominates economically, 
pursues territorial claims in the South China Sea and is therefore 
also on course for conflict with other riparian states. 
In addition to efforts to open up new markets and investment 
locations for Chinese industry through the new Silk Roads, the 
supply of raw materials plays a key role (Chapter 5) - and thus the 
question whether B&R will act as a further engine for the fossil 
growth model, or whether they will initiate an energy revolution or 
even an "ecological civilization", as the initiators like to proclaim. 
Rather on the edge of the Silk Roads lies Africa (Chapter 9), 
which as a supplier of oil and other commodities and as a cus-
tomer for infrastructure projects and low-cost consumer goods 
has helped to promote China's rise. However, this was not a cata-
lyst for a self-reliant development. With Xi Jinping taking office, 
a redefinition of China's strategy in Africa is now emerging, with 
initial effects especially in East Africa. 
The expansion of China's economic power by B&R is associated 
with a growing political influence on governments and increased 
competition with other hegemonic powers. A more self-confi-
dent, more active foreign policy is accompanied by military ar-
mament. This has far-reaching implications on the constellations 
of a multipolar world order. Some warn that China is striving for 
global hegemony, even a new Empire, while Beijing itself offers a 
balanced "new type of great power relations" (Chapter 11). 
After five years, the contours of B&R become clearer. Concrete 
effects become more visible. The analyses and positions, which 
at first were rather speculative and wait-and-see, are becoming 
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increasingly based on more reliable information and more pro-
nounced. However, any attempt to grasp the scale and impact of 
the initiative still gives only a preliminary picture.
Bonn, Germany, October 2018
2. Ways out of the crisis
The initiative of the new Silk Roads marks a structural crisis in 
China's seemingly unstoppable rise to global economic power. At 
the same time, as an expansion of the Chinese version of state cap-
italism (Brink/Nölke 2013), it represents its consistent continu-
ation. The successful PR campaign to complement the rather un-
wieldy official names OBOR or BRI with the reminiscence to the 
historic Silk Roads proves to be a clever move in many respects. 
The romantic image of Silk Road mercantilism (Xin Zhang 2016) 
suggests a pre-capitalist situation: equal exchange relations, co-
operation on many levels, a community with similar interests, re-
sponsibilities and goals, an orientation towards useful goods, as 
well as cultural enrichment, and the exchange of ideas, science 
and technological progress. This image mystifies and obscures the 
asymmetry of China's economic power vis-à-vis its neighbouring 
countries, which B&R further increases.
 
Go West, Go Out
Since the beginning of economic liberalization in the late 1970s, 
when Deng Xiaoping drew the consequences of the failed self-suf-
ficiency of the "Great Leap Forward" and the deep political crisis 
of the Mao era, the government  entered the path into "socialism 
with Chinese characteristics" by 'crossing the river by feeling the 
stones' (Deng Xiaoping ). This development took place in a contin-
uous expansion movement, often according to the trial-and-error 
method of experimental arrangements: parallel to the beginnings 
of liberalization with privatization and a market economy in ag-
riculture, an export-oriented industrialization was started, first 
in the Special Economic Zones (SEZ) of the coastal regions in the 
East such as Shenzhen. This export-oriented industrial growth 
strategy led to accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) 
in 2001, which promoted and represented 'Western' globalization. 
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Already around the turn of the Millennium, the expansion of this 
development into the interior of the country and the western re-
gions ("Go West") began in order to reduce the growing gap be-
tween industry and agriculture, city and country, east and west. 
At the same time, systematic government support was used to pro-
mote the positioning of Chinese corporations as investors and buy-
ers on the global market ("Going global"). In 2010, the Ministry of 
Agriculture also called on the country's agricultural investors to 
adopt a "Going outward" strategy. According to Cheng Guoqiang, 
one of the most influential agricultural strategists, their double 
goal is “to maintain sovereignty and to occupy command levels of 
international competition" (cited in: Hoering 2016). 
While the "Going global" strategy initially focused on the sup-
ply of important resources such as minerals, energy and agricul-
tural raw materials, the corporations increasingly advanced into 
other economic sectors as well. In 2014, the country became the 
world's second largest foreign investor with $116 billion. Now, 
more than 110 Chinese multinational companies are listed in the 
Fortune Global 500 list of the top-selling companies, compared to 
10 in 2000. Three-quarters of these are state-owned or state-con-
trolled companies. 
This phase of growth with massive state support, high foreign 
investment, export orientation, energy-intensive mass production 
of cheap commodities, low wages, early capitalist working con-
ditions and an industrial reserve army of migrant workers with-
out rights from rural regions is regarded as a successful model of 
self-reliant development. Economically, it brought about the rise 
to second largest economy and trading power. With poverty re-
duction, rising living standards and the emergence of a large con-
sumption-oriented middle class, the strategy has achieved greater 
successes than the development models that the Western indus-
trialized countries of the global South and the successor countries 
of the Soviet Union have come up with. And unlike Western econ-
omies, which increasingly relied on financialization strategies as 
growth and accumulation engines, China initially remained cau-
tious about the financial market. 
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One point of reference for the Chinese development was the 
rise of the East Asian economies; Singapore's long-time author-
itarian head of state Lee Kuan Yew is regarded as a role model 
for Xi Jinping. In "state-driven market economies" such as China 
(Brink/Nölke 2013: 21), the omnipresent role of the state differs 
from state intervention in Western capitalism, for example in cri-
sis situations. The state has far-reaching macro-political control 
capacities in terms of economic liberalization, growth dynam-
ics and crisis management, as well as selective integration into 
the world market. China's special features are the authority and 
socially deeply embedded power structures of the state and the 
Communist Party. This state capitalism 3.0 thus establishes "an 
alternative model to liberal Western capitalism with considera-
ble development potential" (Brink/Nölke 2013: 29).
Limits to growth
Tobias ten Brink (2013b) describes China's political economy since 
Deng Xiaoping era as an "armada of small ships” travelling at full 
speed in different directions. Many foreign investments appar-
ently also followed the motto of „feeling the stones“, although there 
were also numerous failures. The companies operating abroad 
were initially mainly banks and insurance companies, infrastruc-
ture operators and commodity and energy companies, i.e. com-
panies that were hardly engaged in high-tech industries. Further 
billions of dollars were invested in real estate, the entertainment 
industry and sports clubs, with which China's entrepreneurs im-
plemented the "Going global" contract profitably in their interest. 
The multiple crisis of 2007/2008 then revealed the structural 
weaknesses of China’s development path. The expansion potential 
of the Chinese economy is shrinking. Important export markets 
are weakening, in key sectors such as steel, cement, coal, ship-
building, solar and wind energy and petrochemicals, all of which 
are closely related to the energy sector, infrastructure and the real 
estate market, massive overcapacities have been created and prof-
itability in heavy industry is falling. After years of labour disputes, 
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wages are rising in the growth locomotives of the coastal regions. 
The indebtedness of the State, state enterprises, provincial gov-
ernments and municipalities is growing alarmingly, as is the de-
pendence on imports of energy resources and other raw materials. 
Despite considerable efforts to upgrading technology, industrial-
ization initially took place without major technological progress. 
These indicators make it clear that capital accumulation and 
expansion can no longer be sustained with the old models (Zhang 
2016). Above all, growth rates declined, a proud signal of catching 
up and a success story for state and party politics. If there had ap-
parently been only one direction since the beginning of economic 
liberalization, namely forward, upward, the fall from double-digit 
rates to six percent after the 2008 financial crisis was an alarm 
signal. At the same time, it threatened the political legitimacy of 
the ruling Chinese Communist Party, which is essentially based 
on its promise to guarantee high growth rates, "moderate pros-
perity for all" and the reduction of regional disparities. The pres-
sure to act is intensified by obvious distortions such as increasing 
social inequality, corruption, real estate speculation and serious 
environmental problems.
Made in China 2025
An immediate response to the economic and financial crisis was a 
massive investment program, initially under the motto "business 
as usual", which brought further state-controlled investment in 
infrastructure and in the expansion of new industrial and urban 
centres in the provinces inland and was intended to boost domes-
tic demand.1 This helped to temporarily accelerate growth again, 
but "it only postponed the day of reckoning" (Rolland 2017: 95). In 
1 We are talking about the equivalent of almost $ 600 billion, the fi-
nancing of which was helped by the considerable foreign exchange re-
serves accumulated in the course of the export orientation and parked in 
US government bonds, among other things. Their reallocation was also 
a response to the fact that the financial crisis had made China's depen-
dence on the US money market clear.
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2012, growth rates slumped again to only eight per cent. Xi Jinping 
used the term "New normal" in May 2014 to put the population 
in the mood for a lasting farewell to double-digit growth rates. In 
a separate variant of a sustainable development model, the rela-
tionships between economic growth, social development and en-
vironmental protection are now to be balanced. The well-known 
environmental researchers Fergus Green and Nicolas Stern see 
this as a "new model for China's economic growth" in an article for 
the journal Climate Policy due to the announced ecological meas-
ures, especially climate protection measures. Rolland (2017) sees 
the promises of further improving the standard of living and mak-
ing China a "fully developed" country and a "powerful nation" by 
2049, 100 years after the founding of the People's Republic, as a 
new "social contract" to secure the acceptance of the political mo-
nopoly of power of the Communist Party. 
At the same time, the government initiated a far-reaching re-
structuring and modernization strategy. Supposedly inspired by 
the German concept of Industry 4.0, under the slogan "Made in 
China 2025", access to innovative technologies and business mod-
els is to create one of the most advanced and competitive econ-
omies in the world, strengthen the competitiveness of Chinese 
companies and promote their global expansion.2 
A showcase project for the future of Chinese industry and its 
competitive potential are the high-speed trains, technology pres-
entation and means of infrastructure diplomacy all in one. They 
illustrate the efficiency and the core message of the development 
concept of the new Silk Roads: Connectivity. 
The focus of "Made in China 2025" is the targeted promotion 
of promising future technologies, especially the accelerated ex-
pansion of Internet-based business areas such as artificial intel-
2 Beijing is also hoping to avoid the so-called "middle income trap", 
in which many emerging countries get stuck after an initial industri-
alization push because they are no longer competitive in view of rising 
wage costs, but have failed to create the conditions for further techno-
logical modernization.
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ligence and the "Internet of Things".3 In addition to the produc-
tion sector, this also involves areas of "critical" infrastructure such 
as energy supply, telecommunications and information technolo-
gies. Their importance for global communications, e-commerce 
and banking, processing industries and logistics, smart cities, 
electro mobility and government control is constantly growing. 
While China has been rather marginal in cyber and financial net-
works, which require an integration with worldwide information 
and capital flows, efforts to create parallel structures and its own 
international standards in these areas are becoming increasingly 
visible in order to counterbalance the overwhelming European es-
pecially US dominance (Mayer/Huotari 2015).
Reorganisation of the armada
As a further response to the structural problems, central gov-
ernment institutions are strengthening their steering capacities. 
These include attempts to curb the now alarmingly growing out-
flow of capital through new capital controls and rules for grant-
ing loans, to prevent so-called "irrational" investment projects 
and to direct foreign investment project more strongly towards 
the core business of Chinese companies. Among the investments 
that will be specifically promoted by government loans from now 
on include high-quality equipment and technologies, mining and 
the energy sector, agriculture and the service sector, as well as in-
ternational R&D collaboration, i.e. everything that can promote 
China's rise in value chains and support B&R. This attempt at 
control is flanked by appeals from the Party and the State Coun-
3 By mid-April 2018, 18 provinces and municipalities had submit-
ted plans to promote and develop Artificial Intelligence (AI) industries, 
led by the industrial centers around Beijing, Shanghai, and Shenzhen. 
Shanghai has the most ambitious plans and is establishing several AI 
development zones. Other cities, such as Hefei in Anhui Province, are 
developing into centers for special applications such as speech recogni-
tion (See Merics Economic Indicators 1/2018).
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cil for companies to act patriotically, professionally, innovatively 
and socially responsibly. 
In addition, at the instigation of the government, several state-
owned companies have been merged in recent years that, accord-
ing to Xi Jinping “play a dominant role in sectors and areas that 
affect national security and the commanding heights of the econ-
omy" (cited by Rolland, 2017: 102). This further strengthens their 
systemic relevance and improves their international competitive-
ness. This has resulted in vertically and horizontally integrated in 
B&R’s core areas: the COSCO Shipping Corporation, the China 
Merchants Group, the mining giant China Minmetals Corpora-
tion, the China State Power Investment Corporation, which now 
also includes nuclear energy, the China Railway Rolling Stock 
Corporation and the world's largest company in the cement in-
dustry. 
In the agricultural sector, which is important for the secure sup-
ply of food and agro-industrial raw materials, the position is also 
being selectively expanded through acquisitions or investments in 
international companies. One of the most spectacular deals was 
the acquisition of agricultural giant Syngenta by ChemChina in 
spring 2017. The state-owned agricultural corporation COFCO is 
moving ever closer to the big players in agricultural trade such as 
the US companies Cargill, ADM and Bunge, by taking over smaller 
trading houses. The aim is to increase the productivity of China’s 
own agriculture through better inputs and technology and to re-
duce dependence on the global agricultural system, which some 
Western agricultural and trading groups control and which is 
subject to large price fluctuations through speculation. "Chinese 
agricultural companies should be pioneers in modernizing agri-
culture," said Ning Gaoning, head of COFCO, China's largest food 
manufacturer and agricultural trader (cited in Hoering 2016). 
Meanwhile, Chinese state-owned enterprises and funds are 
the largest investors abroad. According to the Financial Times in 
the second half of 2016, the number of contracts signed by state-
owned corporations rose by 86 percent, while private investment 
fell by 40 per cent. In the first half of 2017, they invested around 
$ 28.7 billion abroad, leaving the private sector behind. The most 
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popular target region for China's worldwide foreign investments 
was the European Union, more than half of which was made in 
France, Germany and England (Hanemann/Huotari 2017). The 
main focus of interest is on technology and state-of-the-art pro-
duction equipment, for example at robot manufacturer KUKA, the 
KrausMaffei Group or Daimler, where Chinese carmaker Geely 
recently became the largest shareholder. In "critical" infrastruc-
ture areas, China State Grid Corporation and world-leading IT 
companies such as ZTE and Huawei are active abroad as compa-
nies that are taking strategic steps to set up large regional power 
grids or a digital silk road. 
The internationalization of state-owned enterprises and their 
transnational activities also improve the possibility of further 
expanding the position of the Chinese currency as a global trade 
and investment currency. With the inclusion of the Renminbi in 
the basket of special drawing rights of the International Mone-
tary Fund (IMF) in October 2016, a milestone has already been 
reached.
Internationalization of the regulatory model
B&R represents a central part of this internal crisis solution by 
combining the restructuring of production conditions with new 
spaces for action and accumulation for Chinese corporations. It 
"arose in connection with the joint efforts of the state and repre-
sentatives of Chinese capital to promote capital accumulation and 
expansion into new geographical and spatial dimensions" (Zhang 
2017: 323). In doing so, it links the necessary further expansion of 
the Chinese economy with the desire of the ruling elites to main-
tain power. Driven by political interests and economic contra-
dictions and endowed with enormous power, based on financial 
strength and the weight of Chinese multinational corporations, it 
represents an internationalization of the Chinese model of order 
in the continuity of a gradual expansion of its own development 
strategy (Schmalz 2015). Its own crisis solution is thereby trans-
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figured as a contribution to the development of the participat-
ing countries, but also to the crisis solution for the global system. 
Initially in the neighbouring regions of Central Asia, South 
Asia and Southeast Asia, China is taking the lead in a program of 
economic integration through infrastructure, investment, trade 
and regional production chains, in which itself holds the posi-
tion as the hub of modern production, innovation and standardi-
zation (Cai 2017 : 5). Following its successful integration into the 
world economy, the rules of which China cleverly and creatively 
exploited, the Silk Road Initiative now represents a new phase in 
which the rules of the game of globalization must be more strongly 
determined by China itself. The "armada of small ships" is now 
to be transformed into a naval unit, steered by a powerful cap-
tain, which will drive forward the dynamics of a transformation 
of the old world order.
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3. Infrastructure as growth strategy
For years, economic researchers and international financial in-
stitutions have warned of the "infrastructure gap", especially in 
the white spots on the infrastructure world map such as Africa, 
Eurasia and South Asia. Although billions are being invested in 
the expansion of roads, railways, airports and pipelines, up to $ 
1 trillion a year would be lacking in the coming years to expand 
the veins of the world economy for further globalization and thus 
overcome  the financial and economic crisis. Beijing, on the other 
hand, does not seem to have any financing problems with the Silk 
Road Initiative.
Mega plans
There are ambitious infrastructure programs in all major eco-
nomic areas, notably fossil fuels, hydropower, transportation 
and telecommunications. The EU, for example, wants to expand 
its North-South and East-West links through a Trans-European 
Transport Network. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
(ASEAN) has been implementing its own connectivity program 
for years. Numerous countries in Central Asia, Pakistan, Mon-
golia and China are working together with multilateral develop-
ment institutions to achieve regional integration through infra-
structure and the promotion of trade (CAREC). There are also 
proposals for highly ambitious projects such as a bridge between 
Alaska and Siberia, a canal through Nicaragua as competition 
for the Panama canal and a canal through the Malaysian penin-
sula. During Xi Jinping’s visit to Brazil in 2014, the plan was an-
nounced for a 5,000-kilometer railway line from the Brazilian At-
lantic coast to the Pacific Ocean in Peru to export soy and iron ore 
to China. At the annual meeting of the World Bank and the Inter-
national Monetary Fund (IMF) in October 2017, the "infrastruc-
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tural arms race," in which China has now taken over the initiative, 
was described as a "race for leadership in the global economy." 
These mega-projects are often coordinated by governments with 
international financial institutions such as the Asian Develop-
ment Bank (ADB), the World Bank, and the IMF. But there are fi-
nancing problems. Governments are heavily indebted, private in-
vestors are holding back in the face of economic and political risks 
and limited prospects for quick profits, and financial institutions 
such as the World Bank or the ADB cannot address the deficit on 
their own. The Silk Road initiative fills this gap: it is the largest 
economic stimulus program of all time, one of the superlatives, 
comparable to the US Marshall Plan after the Second World War. 
A key instrument for this is the Asian Infrastructure Investment 
Bank (AIIB) initiated by Beijing, which commenced operations 
in early 2016 with a starting capital of $ 100 billion. It “was en-
visioned to be a new kind of multilateral development bank with 
twenty-first century governance," said Jin Liqun, President of 
AIIB. It does not want to be seen as a competitor to other mul-
tilateral banks such as the ADB, in which Japan has the leading 
role, but sees itself as complementary. The rush on membership 
and thus on new financial resources was great, much to the dis-
pleasure of the US government. Nearly all countries from East 
Asia to Europe have joined, including Britain and France, and 
Germany has even become the fourth largest shareholder.1 Al-
though it is organized similarily to the World Bank or the ADB 
as a multilateral institution, Beijing has secured the authority 
to issue guidelines. In addition, numerous billion-dollar invest-
ment funds such as the Silk Road Fund are under Beijing’s di-
rect control. Large financial institutions such as the Exim Bank, 
the China Development Bank, and the Agricultural Bank of 
China have been given additional financial leeway by the gov-
ernment to launch infrastructure and development projects. 
With infrastructure programs as a framework, mega-corridors or 
"tradescapes" are to be created at the same time, in which com-
1 Japan and the US decided not to participate; membership applica-
tions from Taiwan and North Korea were rejected.
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panies can find attractive investment conditions in industrial 
zones and urban growth centers. The planners have covered the 
maps of Southeast Asia, Africa and Latin America with a dense 
network of such economic and growth corridors. A study by the 
NGO network Counter Balance, which analyzes the activities of 
multilateral banks, speaks of a "reconfiguration of economic ge-
ography": economic activities are merged and geographically 
concentrated in megacorridors in order to improve the compet-
itive advantage for some industries. David Harvey speaks of a 
"spatial fix". The aim is to increase profits by combining invest-
ment, access to cheap labor, raw materials and markets (Hild-
yard/Sol 2017). In these new globalized regions, interconnected 
economic activities can move freely in geographic regions. They 
are subject to a common neoliberal matrix or culture of agree-
ments and contracts, regulations, legal frameworks and prac-
tices that determine trade relations, institutions and structures. 
The euphemistic magic formula of these infrastructure and in-
vestment programs from Beijing via Brussels to Washington: to 
bring growth, an expansion of trade and economic integration, 
and the creation of millions of jobs through the restructuring of 
entire regions and economies. Political analyst Parag Khanna, 
on the other hand, emphasizes the geo-economic and political 
functionality: "We are moving into an era where cities will mat-
ter more than states and supply chains will be a more important 
source of power than militaries – whose main purpose  will be to 
protect supply chains rather than borders. Competitive connec-
tivity is the arms race of the 21st century" (2016: 6). 
An economic corridor as a turning point
The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) is one of the most 
important and expensive B&R projects. It runs between Kashgar 
in the western Chinese province of Xinjiang and the port town 
of Gwadar on the Pakistani coast of the Persian Arabian Gulf. 
In total, more than $ 60 billion are to be invested, one third of 
which will be spend on expanding the port of Gwadar, on roads 
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and railway lines, pipelines, agricultural operations  and indus-
try, and two-thirds in power plants and other energy projects. 
So far, Gwadar is not much more than a sleepy port, with fish-
ing boats and small shipyards. Ten years ago some huge loading 
cranes were erected. But only a few cargo ships dock here. That 
is about to change. A deep-sea port is planned as a transship-
ment point for the economic corridor. Almost 300 hectares of 
land have been leased to the state-owned China Overseas Port 
Holding Company (COPHC), which also operates the port, for a 
free trade zone with its own energy supply and hotels. Plans are 
even underway to set up a holiday industry  for Chinese tourists 
from western China: Yachting harbours, moorings for cruise lin-
ers, parks, theatress, nightclubs, golf courses, wellness hotels and 
water sports facilities are to be built along a long stretch of coast. 
Proponents in the country, especially in the government, see the 
economic corridor as a "turning point" for the country's ailing 
economy. Politically, the government hopes that the investment 
projects will provide a dynamic for its re-election. For China, 
this Pakistani Silk Road axis would create an alternative route 
for the supply of energy to the sea route through the Strait of 
Malacca and to the pipelines through Myanmar to the south-
western Chinese province of Yunnan. The economic corridor is 
also intended to accelerate development in Xinjiang Province. 
However, there are not only supporters of the initiative in Paki-
stan. Fishermen must fear being displaced and losing access to 
their fishing grounds. While the port and economic zone are to 
have their own electric power supply and a desalination plant, 
the inhabitants of Gwadar will continue to have to live with con-
stant power cuts and water shortages. Instead of locals, hun-
dreds of workers from China are employed. In October 2017, a 
grenade was thrown into the Chinese workers’ housing com-
plex, just one of many attacks on the project’s construction sites. 
Neither the provincial governments nor the local population are 
informed of the intentions, let alone involved in the planning. The 
master plan, published by the Pakistani  daily Dawn in November 
2017, was drawn up by the China Development Bank and the Chi-
nese National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC). 
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Among other things, the Chinese side secures far-reaching pow-
ers and privileges for its investors. Pakistani media then referred 
to Beijing as the "new East India Company" that wants to "colo-
nise" Pakistan. Militant autonomy movements in the backward 
province of Baluchistan, where Gwadar is located, could continue 
to gain popularity.
Economic stimulus program as debt trap
Large infrastructure projects are first and foremost an economic 
stimulus program for industry groups. Money from Beijing is of-
ten tied to the  awarding of contracts to Chinese companies, so 
simply switch from one account to another in China.2 "Lending to 
your neighbors to finance infrastructure projects that you build 
for them is a shrewd way to make friends while generating busi-
ness for Chinese firms and earning better returns than U.S. Treas-
ury bills," Joshua Eisenman and Devin T. Stewart ironically com-
ment on this widespread practice in the Foreign Policy magazine. 
Even the China Daily state media paper admits in February 2018 
"that it looks like it is a reserve for Chinese state-owned enter-
prises, financed by Chinese banks and run by Chinese workers." 
In addition, financing commitments from China are "readily 
available money" for recipient governments. Compared with in-
ternational development banks, interest rates and other condi-
tions are in some cases more favourable and the award criteria 
simpler. However, commercial loans account for a consider-
able and increasing proportion. If the promised economic up-
turn fails to materialise this could further increase the country’s 
debt. Pakistan is one of the countries already heavily indebted. 
In addition, large infrastructure investments are notorious for 
2 In projects financed by China, almost 90 percent of the contrac-
tors involved were Chinese firms, with the remainder being domestic 
and other foreign firms. By way of comparison, in multilateral devel-
opment bank projects a good forty percent were domestic companies, 
the remainder shared between by Chinese and other foreign companies 
(Hillman 2018: 3).
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corruption, cost overruns, and construction ruins, called "white 
elephants," because they are often not preceded by comprehen-
sive, reliable profitability calculations. Some B&R investments are 
"little more than geopolitical bribery" (Miller 2017: 483). The op-
portunities for public scrutiny of agreements negotiated behind 
closed doors by governments, financiers and transnational corpo-
rations are limited due to lack of transparency and accountability. 
In addition, success is not only measured in kilometres of roads, 
rails and pipelines or in power plants and large dams. So far, 
B&R's motto has been "First build, then the investors will come". 
Whether it is really possible to push industrialization, comprehen-
sive economic development and an increase in government reve-
nues with infrastructure investments is a hope for the future, the 
fulfillment of which depends on many other factors. At best, they 
form economic enclaves in which a lot of money can be earned 
and corruption often flourishes. In Pakistan, there was a fierce 
dispute between the provinces over the course of the economic 
corridor. Other areas, such as rural agriculture and local indus-
tries, and thus the creation of jobs or the supply of water and elec-
tricity for large sections of the population, not to mention health 
care and education are beyond the horizon of interests and plan-
ning. But infrastructure development that is limited to expanding 
trade between industrialized countries and with their raw mate-
rial suppliers and developing individual strategically located hubs 
as transshipment points and concentrated production locations 
cannot bring lasting economic growth or even sustainable eco-
nomic development for the participating countries.
Mega risks
Moreover, experience to date shows that the significant social and 
environmental risks associated with large infrastructure projects 
are often underestimated or ignored. These include forced re-
3 Allegedly, major Chinese banks expect to have to write off most of 
their loans in countries like Pakistan.
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location, lack of compensation, environmental damage, human 
rights violations and poor working conditions. They could multi-
ply through the Silk Road Initiative and other megaprogrammes. 
But by integrating large infrastructure and economic corridors 
into individual countries and regions in the global production 
and marketing chains, they also intensify competition: in order 
to attract potent investors to their sprawling special economic 
zones and industrial parks, most governments rely on the same 
means: tax breaks and profit transfers for companies, deregu-
lation, free trade agreements and investor protection. Laws, in-
stitutions and jurisdiction are tailored to the needs of corpora-
tions. As this has become the norm, there is a "race to the bottom" 
in the social and environmental fields. Wages and social stand-
ards are kept low, labour and trade union rights are restricted or 
denied, environmental standards are relaxed and risks are ig-
nored. In many cases, this leads to repression against local pop-
ulations who defend themselves, as well as against environmen-
talists, human rights groups and media who point to grievances. 
At the same time, infrastructure development leads to increased 
extractivism, as natural resources and agricultural regions be-
come accessible, larger quantities can be transported and costs 
fall (Hildyard/Sol 2018). The infrastructure makes it easier to sat-
isfy the hunger for resources and to quickly realize profits. Poorer, 
over-indebted countries in particular are becoming even more 
deeply involved in the plundering of their natural resources. But 
the "Gold rush" with extractivism as the basis for economic de-
velopment leads to a missed opportunity for an alternative, more 
independent development path, regrets Sukhgerel Dugersuren of 
the Mongolian organization OT Watch. This increases the envi-
ronmental risks in the mining regions and the contribution to cli-
mate change through the expansion of fossil fuels.
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Loose guidelines
Given the economic, social and environmental risks inherent in 
large-scale infrastructure and the fierce protests, campaigns and 
resistance that have repeatedly led to project failures, multilat-
eral development banks such as the World Bank and the ADB 
felt compelled to introduce social and environmental stand-
ards for their lending in addition to a review of economic via-
bility. Important cornerstones are transparency, an assessment 
of possible impacts on people and the environment, informa-
tion dissemination and participation opportunities, the con-
sent of affected groups of people (Free Prior Informed Consent) 
and regulations and compensation for unavoidable resettlement. 
In the past, Chinese companies abroad have contributed to China's 
poor reputation in many developing and emerging economies by 
overexploiting forests and natural resources, violating environ-
mental laws and regulations, corruption and arrogant manage-
ment. Protests and resistance to land grabbing, poor working con-
ditions or ruthless business practices that ignored the interests 
of local communities led to the abandonment of many projects. 
The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank AIIB is one of the 
attempts to improve this image. It advertises not only to act 
"lean", i.e. without time-consuming and costly procurement 
procedures, and "clean", i.e. free of corruption. It also sees it-
self as a "green" bank. Like  the World Bank and ADB, it has for-
mulated lending standards in order to take into account the so-
cial and ecological concerns of its lending activities. However, 
Korinna Horta of urgewald criticises that they leave too much 
scope and loopholes for recipient governments and investors com-
pared with the previous standards. The review, monitoring and 
participation of civil society forces in the approval of projects is 
not sufficient to reduce the risks of adverse effects. So far, how-
ever, the AIIB has carried out most of the projects it approved 
by the end of 2017 together with the other multilateral develop-
ment banks, leaving them to do the work and take responsibility. 
Further attempts to get rid of the bad image are guidelines that 
the government has issued for Chinese companies for foreign in-
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volvement. They are based on Western industrialized countries’ 
guidelines for "Corporate Responsibility" - also to the effect that 
compliance with them is voluntary. The recently tightened guide-
lines for loans from state-owned banks, which are intended to 
promote the modernization of the Chinese economy, restrict the 
allocation of funds to projects that do not meet the target coun-
try's requirements for local environmental protection, energy con-
sumption and safety standards. Only: The proof of the pudding 
is in the eating.
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Korinna Horta
"Germany lends credibility to the AIIB"
Uwe Hoering: The Federal Government was in a hurry to join 
the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank AIIB. Germany is the 
fourth largest shareholder, occupyies one of the executive direc-
tor posts and is currently the representative and coordinator of 
the AIIB member countries of the euro zone. This gives it a key 
position. Why did the Federal Government push for it?
Korinna Horta: The Federal Ministry of Finance justified Ger-
many's role as a founding member of the AIIB by being able to 
ensure compliance with the highest possible standards and best 
practices in the AIIB. This decision fell however without a public 
discussion, the Bundestag did not take note of it at all.
What is the significance of Germany's accession to the AIIB?
Important is not the financial participation of Germany, but the 
international credibility, which the AIIB receives by the member-
ship of Germany and other countries, which are not from Asia. And 
that is priceless: In the summer of 2017, important credit rating 
agencies such as Moody's and S&P awarded the AIIB a Triple A rat-
ing for creditworthiness. As a result, it has a higher rating than its 
largest shareholders, China, India, and Russia. This puts the bank in 
a better position to raise money on the international capital markets 
and expand its business beyond its own $ 100 billion capital base. 
Germany is now jointly responsible for the projects financed by 
the AIIB. What is necessary so that it can really assume this re-
sponsibility?
After urgewald and others drew the attention of parliament and 
the public to the importance of the AIIB and the German role, CDU, 
SPD, Bündnis 90/Die Grünen and Die Linke called on the federal 
government to support environmental, social and human rights 
standards in the AIIB that are at least comparable to the standards 
of the World Bank. Investments in coal-fired power plants and 
nuclear power plants should be excluded. It is also necessary to 
create procedures for the publication of information and account-
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ability and to establish an independent complaints mechanism. 
Why are such standards and procedures so important for large 
infrastructure projects?
The dark side of infrastructure investment, and espe-
cially of large mining projects, hydroelectric power sta-
tions, coal-fired power stations and export corridors, is 
massive displacement and forced resettlement, fraud and cor-
ruption. Many projects are uneconomical or nonsensical, 
so called "white elephants", and cause a huge debt burden. 
It is also important that the way in which political decisions are 
made in the infrastructure sector is closely linked to the subse-
quent quality of the projects, much more closely than financial 
issues. For example, transparency and public participation are 
central in the preparatory phase, because decisions such as the 
location of infrastructure measures can have a serious impact on 
the environmental and social situations.
Where is the AIIB currently facing these challenges? Does it meet 
these requirements?
In January 2016, environmental and social guidelines were 
issued, including regulations on environmental impact assess-
ment, forced resettlement and impacts on indigenous peoples who 
are particularly vulnerable and internationally protected. But the 
loopholes are huge: how and within what time frame the bank's 
customers meet these standards must be "acceptable" to the bank, 
they say. But who decides what is acceptable? Customers can also 
adhere to their own standards instead of the AIIB standards. So 
far there are in any case no procedures to ensure comparability. 
One example of these gaps is the AIIB energy strategy, which was 
adopted in June 2017. It contains many positive references, such as 
support for the Paris Climate Agreement and the United Nations 
Sustainable Energy for All program. How concrete AIIB invest-
ments will contribute to climate protection and access to sustain-
able energy remains to be seen. It should be noted that the AIIB 
energy strategy does not exclude the financing of coal projects. 
Basic policy guidelines such as the publication of informa-
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tion, in particular the comprehensive documentation of indi-
vidual projects, and an independent accountability mechanism 
that deals with complaints from affected population groups 
and checks compliance with environmental and social stand-
ards do not yet exist. Initial drafts submitted in early 2018 
were considered too weak by non-governmental organizations 
as well as by some member States and are now being revised. 
To date, the AIIB has carried out most of its projects jointly with 
other multilateral banks such as the World Bank and the Asian 
Development Bank (ADB). Thus their environmental and social 
standards apply, which are at least slightly better. Does this co-
operation therefore help to prevent that the AIIB projects violate 
minimum standards?
The real test for the AIIB comes when it starts to develop its 
own project programme. However, a very important impact is al-
ready being felt: in response to the establishment of the AIIB, pres-
sure grows on the other banks to lower their standards because 
they compete with the AIIB on projects and lending in the future. 
It is still quite early, but how does a first summary of the work 
of Germany in the AIIB look like?
With regard to the energy strategy already mentioned, Ger-
many, which represents all the AIIB member countries of the Euro 
zone, had little influence on the final version as regards the fi-
nancing of coal projects. Now Germany must advocate AIIB policy 
guidelines on public access to information on specific projects and 
an effective complaints mechanism. It will be a constant struggle 
for Germany and the other member states to ensure that the AIIB 
does not become an instrument for exporting a new world order 
in which fundamental human rights, freedom of expression and 
assembly and other democratic values are set aside.
Dr. Korinna Horta has been dealing with the environmental and 
human rights standards of international financial institutions 
for more than 20 years and is a senior researcher at urgewald.
4. Opportunities and risks 
in Central Asia
An official starting signal for the new Silk Road Initiative is the 
speech held by State and Party leader Xi Jinping in September 
2013 in Astana at Nazarbayev Nazarbajev University, named af-
ter Kazakhstan’s permanent president. The place was wisely cho-
sen for several reasons.
A bridging of 2000 years
First there is the historical symbolism. A branch of the old Silk 
Roads ran through the southern part of present-day Kazakhstan. 
With his speech Xi Jinping practically followed in the footsteps of 
Zhang Qian, who more than 2000 years ago was the first Chinese 
envoy to travel to the territory of today’s Iran, "sent to open the 
door to friendly contacts between China and Central Asian coun-
tries as well as the transcontinental Silk Road linking East and 
West, Asia and Europe". The descriptions with which Xi Jinping, 
following on from this founding myth, announced the "Eurasian 
Land Bridge" between Western China and Europe, have since been 
the basic features of the official narrative. With the assurance 
that economic development should no longer be driven forward 
at the expense of the ecological environment, he added a green 
accent to the initiative. It would also combat the "three evils" of 
terrorism, separatism and religious extremism in the region by 
creating stability through economic development. The announce-
ment that China will neither intervene in the internal affairs of 
Central Asian countries nor seek a leadership role in regional 
affairs has also met with broad approval from political elites. 
With Nursultan Nazarbayev, Kazakhstan's permanent president, 
Xi Jinping courted an important ally in many respects. The for-
mer Soviet republic of Kazakhstan in the centre between Eu-
rope and Asia likes to call itself the "centre of the world" and is 
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today the economically strongest country in Central Asia. With 
its ambitious economic modernisation and diversification pro-
gramme "Kazakhstan 2050", which includes investments in steel 
mills, hydropower and automotive engineering, and the infra-
structure program Nurly Zhol, the “Path to the future” author-
itarian ruler Nazarbayev is a promising economic partner for 
China. The government wants to reduce economic dependency 
on Russia and, in view of low prices and dwindling reserves, build 
economic alternatives to the oil sector, whose revenues have so 
far helped to finance state control and legitimacy. That's why it 
sought closer cooperation with China at an early stage, whose 
billions in loans and investments strengthen their friendship. 
Meanwhile, the two countries are "as close as teeth and lips," 
Xi Jinping flattered, leaving open who teeth, and who lips are.1  
Another reason choosing Astana for the speech is Kazakhstan's 
key role in the rail links between China and Europe. It is also an 
important Go-stone in the "New Great Game"2 between the EU, 
Russia and China in the successor countries to the Soviet Un-
ion on the redistribution of resources, especially oil and gas. It is 
also the direct western neighbour of the Xinjiang-Uiygur prov-
ince, with which it has close historical, cultural and religious ties.
1 The article "Marching Westwards: The Rebalancing of China's Geo-
strategy" by Wang Jisi (2012) shows that geostrategic considerations 
played a role too: In the context of an encirclement and direct confron-
tation with the US in East Asia, which under Barack Obama increased its 
engagement in the region ("Pivot to Asia") and tried to isolate China while 
negotiating the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) agreement, he pleaded 
for a strategic reorientation of China towards its Western neighbours’.
2 The Great Game is the 19th century political and diplomatic con-
frontation between the British and Russian empires for control of Af-
ghanistan and neighboring regions of Central and South Asia, includ-
ing India, the "crown jewel" of the British Empire.
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Energy hub Xinjiang
Xinjiang Province is the westernmost outpost of the “Go West” 
policy and one of its largest construction projects. A  "new terri-
tory" that has been a Chinese area of expansion and influence for 
centuries, and somewhat like the gradually developed “Wild West” 
of the Chinese Empire and the young People's Republic of China, 
which was brought under control step by step, between 1934 and 
1949 there was a Soviet Republic of East Turkestan, which still 
inspires autonomy aspirations and separatist movements today
The province, bordering other important countries of the Silk 
Road Initiative such as Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Pakistan and Mon-
golia is home to China's largest coal, gas and oil reserves. Thanks 
to central government policies, the capital Urumqi has become 
an economic centre of Central Asia. Until a few years ago, just a 
faint echo of its former central role on the Northern Silk Road, it 
was expanded as a western hub and energy centre for China's new 
“Neighbourhood policy”, with a new airport and access to the in-
ner-Chinese high-speed train network, with road connections to 
Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, with a China-Eurasia trade fair and as a 
centre for communication technology. Urumqi has also been given 
an international boost by the establishment of regional headquar-
ters of the multilateral Central Asian Economic Cooperation or-
ganisation (CAREC), which promises synergy effects with the Silk 
Road Initiative. With the CPEC economic corridor between Kash-
gar in the southwest of Xinjiang, where the only Special Economic 
Zone in western China is located, and the Pakistani port of Gwadar, 
the province is also the bridgehead for this B&R flagship project. 
The development led to a strong influx of Chinese from other re-
gions. The Muslim Uighurs are marginalized, and many are un-
able to take advantage of the opportunities offered by the eco-
nomic boom. Culture, language and religion are infiltrated, some 
of them deliberately restricted by the state. There have been fierce 
protests against this in recent years, to which the government in 
Beijing responded with state repression and the massive expan-
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sion of the security apparatus.3 This explosive situation is one rea-
son why Xi Jinping called on Astana to fight the "three evils". It is 
feared that discontent in Xinjiang could be bolstered by militant 
groups in Pakistan or Afghanistan, where there are said to be nu-
merous fighters from Xinjiang. The Silk Road should now dry up 
the ground for this in the region through economic development, 
bring prosperity and stability and involve opposition groups - a 
strategy that has not been very successful in Xinjiang itself so far.
As a showcase for the great opportunities for neighbourly co-
operation between Xinjiang and Kazakhstan, and beyond that 
between China and Central Asia, infrastructure projects in the 
steppe at Khorgos Eastern Gate have been under construction 
for several years now. In the new border terminal, the containers 
are reloaded with giant loading cranes on their way to Europe and 
back, because Chinese and Central Asian railway lines have dif-
ferent track gauges. Far from the nearest sea, an inland port with 
logistics companies, trading companies and financial service pro-
viders is planned here. For investors, an industrial zone has been 
established on both sides of the border. Economic and political 
support comes from the highest authority: Khorgos reports di-
rectly to the government in Beijing. The importance of the location 
was underlined by the fact that the state-owned shipping company 
COSCO acquired shares in the "East Gate" of Khorgos. At the Silk 
Road Summit in Beijing in May 2017, videos were shown in an end-
less loop in the press centre, painting the future in bright colours. 
On the Chinese side of the border, the first skyscrapers, apart-
ment blocks and shopping centres have been built with govern-
ment funds. Duty-free shops are waiting for tourists to travel to 
the remote region, and merchants from Kazakhstan come to shop. 
Some businesses have been established, but on the Kazakh side 
there are hardly any signs yet that a trade and industrial metrop-
olis will grow here in the near future The port of Shanghai can 
handle a year's container turnover in one or two days. More im-
3 Recently there have been reports by human rights organisations and 
in the media about large internment or „re-education“ camps in Xinji-
ang, denied vehemently by Beijing. 
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portant than Khorgos for B&R is the Dostyk transhipment centre 
a few hundred kilometres north of Khorgos, which owes its name 
"friendship" to the long past times of Russian-Chinese brother-
hood, and the highway further south, which leads via the Ka-
zakh economic metropolis of Almaty to Russia. Managers of the 
planned industrial zone are bravely spreading optimism: the first 
companies have already announced that they will relocate produc-
tion facilities here from the east of the country, while HP, Toyota, 
DHL and Alibaba are planning to open logistics centres.
Winner in the new distribution roulette
While Khorgos is still waiting for the blossoming future, the real 
landmark for the close relations between China and Kazakhstan is 
the 24-story Beijing Palace Soluxe Hotel in the centre of Astana, 
with curved Chinese rooftops and within sight of the presidential 
palace. It is said that the hotel, where Chinese guests like to stay, 
belongs to the state-owned China National Petroleum Company 
(CNPC), which controls a quarter of Kazakhstan's oil production. 
China's real interest lies in the mineral resources of Central Asia. 
Kazakhstan has large oil deposits and considerable offshore re-
serves. A crown jewel is the Kashagan oil field in the Caspian Sea, 
in which China secured a share and outperformed its competitor 
India (Smith Stegen 2015). The neighbouring countries of Azer-
baijan and Turkmenistan also have large oil and gas reserves and 
potential for hydropower. In recent years, the former Soviet repub-
lics have gained more independence from Russia and greater na-
tional control over resources, and have become "autonomous ac-
tors" in the new distribution poker, especially Kazakhstan (Smith 
Stegen/Kusznir 2015: 103). As in other countries of the former So-
viet Union, oligarchs and local elites often benefited most. In order 
to modernize the extractive industries, which were geared to sup-
plying the Soviet Union, to increase exports and to diversify the 
economy, they are looking for new solvent buyers and investments. 
China helped them as a financier and counterweight against Rus-
sia. New oil pipelines between Kazakhstan and China in the past 
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ten years have broken the export monopoly of Russian compa-
nies. Many companies in Kazakhstan's oil sector are largely con-
trolled by Chinese investors. Turkmenistan supplies almost half 
of China's gas imports through a 2,000-kilometre pipeline. Over 
the past decade CNPC has outperformed Russian corporations, 
and Western corporations and India's national oil and gas com-
pany ONGC have been forced out of business. In the meantime, 
China has replaced Russia as its largest trading partner and is the 
most important investor, lender and buyer of energy resources. 
The new Silk Road Initiative is now "the culmination of several 
years of careful and strategic positioning by China to be able to 
secure both the cooperation and the resources of several Central 
Asian states" (Smith Stegen 2015: 100).
Russia, the naked gun
Russia's enthusiasm for B&R was therefore limited in the be-
ginning, not only because of China's successful competition 
for natural resources. Moscow pursues its own ideas of re-
gional greatness; like Xi Jinping, President Vladimir Putin is a 
nationalist who also sees Russia humiliated after the collapse 
of the Soviet Union and wants to restore the country's histor-
ical sphere of influence. He sees himself as the central archi-
tect of the political and security order in Eurasia. Shortly after 
the financial crisis in 2008 he had shown with his surprising 
proposal of a free trade area from Lisbon to Vladivostok with 
a common industrial policy and a common energy market that 
the Zeitgeist of functional connectivity had also gripped him. 
But the Ukrainian crisis at the latest brought Putin out of this 
dream of Eurasian integration under Moscow's leadership and 
back into geopolitical realities. Russia thus lost its economically 
strongest partner, and the sanctions of the West brought fur-
ther problems. Integration efforts were increasingly directed to-
wards the east. The Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), which 
was formed in 2015 by Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Belarus 
and Armenia, aims to reduce trade barriers between the partic-
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ipating countries and to promote economic integration. For the 
train connections between China and Europe, it has the advan-
tage of reducing internal trade barriers and border formalities. 
But for the member countries, economic problems such as bar-
riers to access to global markets through higher tariffs and Rus-
sia’s dominance reduce their attractiveness. Moreover, the Mos-
cow government has been unable to meet bilateral commitments 
such as the implementation of infrastructure projects. Coun-
tries like Turkmenistan and Tajikistan are reluctant to give in 
to Russia's bid to join - especially as China offers an alternative. 
The difficulties of the Economic Union show that Moscow lacks 
the economic means to assert its claim to hegemony. The justi-
fied concern that China's Eurasian initiatives might pass Rus-
sia by is therefore driving Moscow into cooperation with Bei-
jing. In May 2015, Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping signed a 
declaration of intent to coordinate the development of EAEU 
and B&R - less a love marriage than a "functional alliance," 
according to author and political advisor Robert D. Kaplan. 
While Russia wants to be able to benefit from the Eurasian land 
bridge and influence China's plans, Beijing is interested in po-
litical and social stability for its energy supply. The region is far 
from being a secure investment environment. The individual 
countries have very different interests and domestic and foreign 
policy development ideas, which repeatedly lead to tensions and 
conflicts. Reservations against too strong a dominance by China 
and fears of a Chinese wave of migration exist not only among 
governments, but also among broad sections of the population. 
Land disputes, labour policies and environmental practices by 
Chinese companies are a constant source of discontent and occa-
sional protests4, as are corruption, a lack of transparency in the 
awarding of contracts and a lack of employment opportunities. 
If China's economic incentives are not sufficient to ensure the de-
sired success of the initiative, Moscow can bring to the partner-
ship its long historical, cultural and political ties and continued 
4 In Kazakhstan, a land reform bill that favored major Chinese inves-
tors led to nationwide protests and state repression.
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close contacts with many governments in the region. On the ba-
sis of its military bases and arms supplies, Russia can also act as 
a security power if instability in Central Asia or neighbouring re-
gions continue to grow (Stronski/Ng 2018). Alexander Gabuev of 
the Carnegie Research Network summed up the essence of this 
division of labour in a bon mot,, "China would be the bank and 
Russia would be the big gun”5.
Bridges across the Amur
The relations between China and Russia in Siberia seem to be 
more manageable and simpler than in the tense and compli-
cated region of Central Asia, and attract far less attention than 
the Silk Road activities in Eurasia or South and Southeast Asia. 
Putin has made the development of natural resources, includ-
ing oil and gas, iron ore and copper, rare earths and gold, the 
national priority for the 21st century. This could be the begin-
ning of a wonderful friendship, albeit not without obstacles. 
One lighthouse project for this is the so-called Arctic energy 
pearl, the Yamal project on Russia's Siberian north coast. One 
of the world's largest natural gas liquefaction plants (LNG) is 
being built here, the cost of which is estimated at $ 27 billion. 
After the sanctions against Russia in 2014, the Silk Road Fund 
and CNPC took over 30 per cent of the shares, making it B&R's 
largest energy project. The joint project with the Russian ma-
jority shareholder Novatek6 envisages that Chinese companies 
will supply 80 per cent of the equipment, demonstrating the 
progress of their own LNG technology. China's CNPC will pur-
chase three million tons of natural gas annually for 20 years. 
The port of Sabetta in the fjord-like estuary of the river Ob, whose 
5 Quoted in Foreign Policy, July 10, 2015
6 The main shareholder of Novatek, Gennady Timchenko, is consi-
dered a member of the Inner Circle around President Putin and his liai-
son with China. See Alexander Gabuev of the Carnegie Research Net-
work in Moscow, in: Downs et al: 2017, 13.
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first expansion phase Putin opened in late 2017, will also be the 
first deep-sea port in this part of the Siberian north coast of Rus-
sia. A connection to the Eurasian rail network is under construc-
tion. This is an important building block for an alternative sec-
ondary route of the maritime Silk Road through the Arctic to 
Europe, which would be shorter than the path through the In-
dian Ocean and therefore has aroused China's interest, even 
though it is not a riparian state (Stronski/Ng 2018: 25ff).7 Be-
cause of climate change, the window of opportunity, the time win-
dow in which the Northeast Passage, which connects the Atlan-
tic with the Pacific along Russia's northern coast,, is ice-free and 
thus navigable for commercial shipping is becoming ever larger. 
Until a few years ago, Chinese companies were excluded from Rus-
sian projects in important mining, construction and infrastruc-
ture sectors. This has changed with Western sanctions and B&R. 
In eastern Siberia, the bridge between Blagoveshchensk and Heihe 
across the border river Amur, in Chinese Heilong Jiang, is due to 
be completed in October 2019, and construction of the bridge has 
been under negotiation for years. It is an important link in the 
economic corridor between China, Russia and Mongolia, which 
is embedded between the two powerful neighbours. A railway 
bridge is to follow, as well as another bridge downstream. In May 
2015, Chinese investors acquired shares for the first time in a Rus-
sian mining project, the Norilsk Nickel copper, iron ore and gold 
mine, whose entire production will probably be exported to China. 
Beijing expects this to boost the economy of its north-eastern 
provinces of Heilongjiang, Jilin and Liaoning, which have be-
come a ‘Rust belt’ due to the deconstruction of the out-dated coal 
and steel industries and are in a deep recession. The bridges over 
the Amur river give them access to the rich natural resources of 
eastern Siberia, extensive forests and farmland, and the pros-
7 In the document ‚China's Arctic Policy’, presented by the State De-
partment in early 2018, Beijing calls for China to be actively involved 
in the "construction" and "development" of the Arctic region, including 
the use of shipping routes, exploration and exploitation of resources. A 
contribution to the protection of the ecosystem and measures against 
climate change is promised.
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pect of transferring obsolete factories. In August 2018, South 
China Morning Post reported, that Russia has made 1 million 
hectares of arable land in the Far East available to foreign in-
vestors, soybean production could substitute imports from the 
US. A railway line is also planned between Harbin, the capital 
of Heilongjiang, and Russia's port city Vladivostok, providing a 
short, direct link to the Pacific Ocean and a future Arctic route. 
In textbook terms, all elements of the Silk Road Initiative can be 
found here: the expansion of infrastructure and economic cor-
ridors, promising access to mineral resources, the relocation of 
industrial overcapacities, labelled as a development push, the 
linking of land and sea routes and the goal of developing Chi-
na's peripheral provinces. Geopolitically, this cooperation with 
Russia offers a further alternative to the US’s enclosure of China. 
However, there are still "serious doubts surrounding the 
realization of pledged investments" (Stronski/Ng 2018: 20). 
One reason for this is Russia's financing problems. In addition, 
Chinese investors are complaining about bureaucratic obstacles, 
reluctant provincial governments and different business cultures, 
as well as protests by population groups who fear environmental 
damage or mobilised in the Baikal region against a lease agree-
ment for 100,000 hectares of land for a Chinese investor. There 
is also fear in Eastern Siberia of a dominance of China or an in-
vasion of millions of Chinese in search of land and resources. In 
contrast to Xinjiang, however, the "three evils" are hardly to be 
feared here.
Unequal partners
The balance of power has unmistakably shifted in favour of China 
not only in Central Asia. " In northeast Asia Russia bandwag-
oned to China and almost ceased to be an independent actor," 
writes an article in the magazine The Diplomat. The inequality 
is not only reflected in who has the initiative to act: China is now 
Russia's largest creditor. Despite mutual mistrust and hegem-
onic competition, Russia and China are dependent on each other. 
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Above all, Moscow needs Beijing's money, technologies and expe-
rience. Conversely, Russia plays a key role in the regions between 
China and Europe, because of its geographical size and its geo-
political weight. Even though Russia's influence in Central Asia 
has declined, it is still an important Svengali. As an adversary, it 
can strongly thwart the plans, as an ally it can contribute to suc-
cess. China continues to need Russia for its energy security. This 
is shown by the supply contract for natural gas from eastern Sibe-
ria for $ 400 billion and the planned “Power of Siberia” pipeline as 
well as a framework agreement on further supplies routes from the 
natural gas fields in western Siberia to Xinjiang. In 2016 Russia 
overtook Saudi Arabia as the main supplier of crude oil, thereby 
contributing to the independence from other oil supplier coun-
tries. Although relations between Moscow and Beijing are "tacti-
cal and opportunist“, they are „marked by increasingly compatible 
economic, political, and security interests“ (Stronski/Ng 2018: 1). 
In addition, observers such as the International Crisis Group 
(2017) also point to other similarities: both want to prevent a 
greater influence of the West, especially the US, in their neigh-
bourhood and are striving to strengthen a multipolar world 
order. Both are afraid of so-called “Colour revolutions” as in 
Ukraine, Georgia or Egypt. Both are convinced that author-
itarian governments are best suited to control potential so-
cial and political conflicts through a strong security apparatus. 
Forgiven and forgotten, therefore, that in the 19th century Rus-
sia was also involved in the humiliation of unequal treaties and 
China had to cede large areas such as Outer Manchuria, thereby 
losing access to the Japanese Sea. Too, the military conflict in 
1969 with the Soviet Union over the border at Amur and its trib-
utary Ussuri now belongs to history.8 Instead, Russia is now being 
courted fiercely. At the Silk Road Summit in Beijing, Vladimir Pu-
tin was usually prominently placed besides Xi Jinping. He kindly 
thanked the initiative and its " creative approach toward fostering 
integration in energy, infrastructure, transport, industry and hu-
8 The disputes were settled after the end of the Soviet Union, with 
Russia recognizing some claims.
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manitarian collaboration" after "we have exhausted many former 
models and indicators of economic development."
5. Limits of Ecological Civilisation
A lot of coal was the most important source of energy for Chi-
na's economic rise. Their mining has turned entire regions into 
hell sites, the mines are among the most dangerous in the world. 
Combustion of coal in households, power plants and industries 
shape the everyday life of the population and the dirty image of 
the country equally. The country has the highest coal consump-
tion worldwide. China’s oil consumption, the second major fos-
sil fuel, is now second only to the US, with which it competes for 
first place as the leading emitter of greenhouse gases. 
Like all developing and emerging economies, Beijing refused 
to accept responsibility for the sins of industrialized countries in 
international climate policy. But since the Paris Climate Confer-
ence in 2015 and the announced withdrawal of the US from the 
Climate Agreement, China's announcement of a U-turn in its en-
ergy policy has made it a promising country in the fight against 
the greenhouse effect. By 2030 at the latest, the peak of CO2 emis-
sions should be reached, and till 2020 the share of non-fossil en-
ergy sources should increase to 20 per cent. At the B&R Forum 
in May 2017, Xi Jinping announced " the new vision of green de-
velopment and a way of life and work that is green, low-carbon, 
circular and sustainable." At the 19th Congress of the Commu-
nist Party in October 2017, he reaffirmed the role of the energy 
sector as the central touchstone for China's goal of becoming an 
„important participant, contributor, and torchbearer in the global 
endeavour for ecological civilization". The Chinese leadership is 
thus countering the concept of sustainable development, which 
was coined at the 1992 UN Conference on Environment and De-
velopment in Rio de Janeiro, and the "Green Economy", with its 
own narrative, also claiming global validity. But is this more than 
just a green facade for the new expansive growth phase of the Chi-
nese development model?
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Homework 
In addition to coal, numerous large dams were built to meet the 
leap in energy demand, which grew with double-digit economic 
growth rates, such as the notorious Three Gorges Dam on the 
Yangtze River. Like coal, they were also associated with severe 
environmental damages, forced resettlement and negative im-
pacts on countries along the lower reaches of cross-border rivers 
in South Asia and the Mekong region. The third and increasingly 
important pillar was rising oil imports from the Middle East, Af-
rica and Latin America. Since the turn of the millennium, how-
ever, the state and the economy have also relied on the expan-
sion of solar and wind energy. In the meantime, not least thanks 
to massive state support for development, production and instal-
lation, many leading manufacturers of wind power plants and 
photovoltaic that compete successfully on the world market have 
come from China. 
One of the renewable energy sources being promoted for Bei-
jing, however, is nuclear energy: in addition to the almost 40 
nuclear power plants already in existence, further reactors are 
planned by 2030. After 2040, fast breeders are to take over an 
increasing share of the supply. Large uranium reserves will be 
built up for the expansion. They will be sourced primarily from 
the strategic partner Kazakhstan, the world's largest producer 
and supplier. 
Compared with the measures to expand the energy mix in order 
to satisfy demand and reduce dependence on individual energy 
suppliers, the announcement of a decarbonisation of the energy 
sector represents a qualitative change, albeit with big question 
marks.1 In December 2017, the government announced that it 
would create the world's largest emissions trading market, with 
rules allegedly more stringent than those of the EU. Another par-
tial step is an increased use of natural gas, which is less harm-
ful to the climate. Estimates suggest that the use of natural gas 
1 For example there are doubts that all wind and solar capacity is re-
ally on the grid, especially in the remote regions of the north and west.
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could increase by eight per cent annually by 2030. The supply is 
to take place partly through the development of shale gas and coal 
gasification, but above all through rising imports, making China 
the world’s leading importer of natural gas. All three of them are 
ecologically risky. 
The clearest signal for an entry into the phase-out is the de-
commissioning of coal-fired power plants and the curtailment of 
plans for further expansion. The magazine Foreign Affairs reports 
that in 2017 alone the construction of more than 100 new coal-
fired power plants was cancelled, coal consumption fell slightly 
for three consecutive years. However, there are doubts that these 
closures were carried out alone or primarily for environmental 
reasons. Greenpeace estimates that on average only half of the 
capacity of coal-fired power plants is used (chinadialogue 2016: 
16). They could therefore be ramped up again at any time in the 
event of an increase in electricity demand.2 
If the energy turnaround is still more of a vision than a real-
ity, many observers believe that China is entering "green develop-
ment", at least in terms of environmental policy and legislation. 
The Chinese government is also well aware of the social and eco-
logical costs of becoming an economic power. The fatal effects 
on soil, water and air and thus on agriculture, health and quality 
of life are too obvious to ignore. Reforms and the transition to a 
"green" economy should now lead to an "ecological civilisation". 
In addition to the long-standing measures to save energy and 
increase efficiency of use, programmes against air and water pol-
lution, reforestation and nature conservation have been intro-
duced. Comprehensive environmental protection was enacted in 
2015, rigid government controls supplemented by market and in-
centive systems (Tracy et al 2017). According to the study, China 
2 Coal consumption for power generation appears to have increased 
slightly in 2017, see Mathews et al. 2018. Feng Hao reports in chinadia-
logue (03.08.2018) that satellite imagery reveals that coal-fired power 
projects that were halted have quietly restarted because demand for 
power is rebounding.
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has initiated central elements of ecological modernisation in its 
environmental regime in recent years. 
However, this finding is subject to the restriction that the lack 
of participation of civil society in decision-making "is the weak-
est spot in the green shift a la China" (ibid: 63). While numerous 
civil society organisations were able to emerge in the environ-
mental and social spheres, protests and resistance against ram-
pant urbanisation and ruthless industrial projects had only lim-
ited room to act and were usually ended quickly with severity or 
a few concessions. The path to ecological civilisation is thus more 
controlled and authoritarian than the concept of sustainable de-
velopment, which places great emphasis on political and social 
aspects and gives broad scope to the participation of the popula-
tion and civil society.
Coal for "Front-line states" 
While many industrialised countries around the world have - often 
hesitantly - begun to abandon coal and other fossil fuels in recent 
years, China has continued to invest in fossil fuels abroad. Until 
three years ago, financing for power plant projects by Chinese de-
velopment banks rose sharply. Two-thirds of the money went to 
coal-fired power plants, above all in India, Indonesia, Mongolia, 
Vietnam and Turkey, while a good quarter went to the construc-
tion of large dams. They were mostly implemented by state-owned 
construction and mining companies and power plant operators 
(Gallegher 2017). China thus compensated for the gradual with-
drawal of international financial institutions such as the World 
Bank and Western governments. The financially strong pension 
funds of Western industrialised countries are also increasingly 
avoiding investments in the coal sector ("divestment"). 
In the Silk Road Initiative, the love of fossil fuels continues. 
For the flagship project CPEC, the economic corridor with Paki-
stan, $ 33 billion have been earmarked for energy projects. This 
is because constant power cuts not only affect everyday life, but 
also economic development. Most of the money is to be invested 
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into coal-fired power plants. Since Pakistan itself has significant 
coal deposits, but hardly any coal mining, a large part of the fuel 
would come from the neighbouring Chinese province of Xinjiang, 
where there is considerable overcapacity. The repayment of the 
billion-Euro loans could then take the form of power supplies to 
China. And if the already highly indebted country gets into fi-
nancial difficulties, Chinese companies could take over shares 
in the power plants – as in the debt equity swap for Hambantota 
port in Sri Lanka. 
To compensate, a green credit window will also be opened. Of-
ficially, a quarter of the new power generation capacity in Paki-
stan capacity is to come from renewable energy sources. These 
include the 1,100 MW Kolala hydroelectric power plant, whose 
future operator, China International Water and Electric Corp 
(CWE), has contractually secured acceptance tariffs that guaran-
tee a high rate of return (Desarnaud/Seaman 2017: 38). But this 
also includes the proposal for one of the largest solar plants in 
the world. One reason for this is likely to be the overcapacities in 
China’s solar and wind industries, for which new markets are be-
ing opened up. But apparently it has the weaker lobby in Beijing 
against the state-owned coal-fired power plant operators such as 
the State Power Investment Corporation (SPIC), half a dozen of 
whom want to benefit from the construction of the plants. Even 
more blatant than in Pakistan is the imbalance in Bangladesh, 
whose government wants Chinese loans for the construction of 
coal-fired power plants with a capacity of 40,000 MW – prom-
ising that later small wind and solar plants will be installed too. 
Pakistan is probably the most important customer, but not an 
isolated case. With government support, operators of coal-fired 
power plants are targeting "front-line states" such as Pakistan, 
Tanzania, Zimbabwe, Mongolia and Egypt, which have so far used 
very little coal for their energy supply (urgewald 2017). Environ-
mental protection is often ignored, corruption is widespread. The 
investments will tie up their energy supply to coal in the long 
term. B&R will thus create sales markets for coal and equipment 
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for years to come, for which China is now the largest exporter.3 
At the same time, China is striving to significantly increase its 
supply of crude oil and natural gas from neighbouring countries 
through new agreements and infrastructure. 
With this externalization, China is increasingly shifting the ful-
filment of its announced climate targets and its ecological foot-
print beyond its borders. "By pursuing a proactive energy invest-
ment strategy under the guise of OBOR, China is in effect servicing 
three levels of interest. On one level, it seeks to meet the needs of 
its own domestic interests – energy security, overcapacities, devel-
opment of inland provinces, etc.“ while „on a second level, it seeks 
to promote its own image as a positive force for economic devel-
opment" (Desarnaud/Seaman 2017: 39). In this way, the global 
presence of Chinese companies is expanding, and at home, the 
population may once again be given a blue sky over China's cities.
Resource Curse 4.0 
A second pillar of the announced construction of ecological civili-
sation alongside the energy transition is the use of new technolo-
gies in business and society, "Made in China 2025". With wind and 
solar energy, the expansion of information technology and e-mo-
bility, smart cities and smart industries, the demand for the re-
quired raw materials such as lithium, rare earths, tantalum, pal-
ladium or cobalt is increasing. The consumption of aluminium, 
the production of which is particularly energy-intensive and en-
vironmentally harmful, and copper is also growing as a result of 
seemingly environmentally friendly projects such as the expan-
sion of e-mobility. Industry 4.0 thus threatens to become the "Re-
source Curse 4.0" in the resource-rich countries of Africa, Asia 
3 The mismatch between fossil and renewable energy projects could 
possibly shift in the future: China 2017 Review has analysed 18 major 
overseas renewable energy projects worth $ 44 billion. Five of these are 
wind and solar projects, but eight are dam projects, which could have 
problematic environmental consequences (Buckley/Nicholas/Brown 
2018).
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and Latin America, warns the non-governmental organization 
PowerShift, which is dealing intensively and critically with en-
ergy issues (2017). In many countries, the wealth of resources is 
perceived as a curse because the enormous profits do not benefit 
the population, but mostly the global corporations and local elites, 
allowing them to maintain authoritarian and repressive regimes. 
With some of these raw materials, China itself has a strong, if 
not market-dominating, position, which makes life difficult for 
competitors: its monopoly on mining and processing of rare earths 
is only slowly reduced by the development of new mining sites in 
other countries. China currently serves 75 per cent of the world-
wide demand for graphite. The fact that Beijing is prepared to use 
resources as weapons in the competitive battle was shown by the 
surprising export ban for rare earths a few years ago. 
For other commodities, access to deposits and production fa-
cilities in other countries becomes necessary if Beijing wants to 
achieve realise its ambitious plans, such as international market 
leadership for electric cars, for example. This includes coopera-
tion with the Russian group Norilsk Nickel in neighbouring Si-
beria, one of the world's largest producers of nickel and palla-
dium. Chinese carmakers have interests in companies in Chile 
and Australia, the main supplier countries of lithium. China Mo-
lybdenum's acquisition of a stake in Tenke Fungurume in the DR 
Congo, one of the world's largest copper and cobalt deposits, is 
another example of how "China is outmanoeuvring other econo-
mies in securing supplies of new commodities" (Buckley/Nicho-
las/Brown 2018: 3).
With B&R onwards to ecological civilization? 
Long before Xi Jinping included the term in his speeches, there 
was a broad discussion in China about ecological civilisation, or 
more precisely about ecological socialism. The eco-Marxist Qing-
zhi Huan, professor of politics at Beijing University, even locates 
the origin of this concept in China (Huan 2016). The goal is cur-
rently at least as important for China's politics as the aspired so-
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cialist modernisation of the economy, politics, social development 
and cultural reconstruction. Since the 18th Congress of the Com-
munist Party in 2012, ecological civilisation has been "the biggest 
buzzword among green thinking and policy discussions in China". 
But without „a much more radical green-left thinking and solu-
tion to the multi-crises of the contemporary world“, he sees the 
danger that it "risks being an ideologically and semantically am-
biguous term" (Huan 2018: 26)
However, with expanded access to a broad spectrum of com-
modities and resources, B&R is driving forward and expanding 
the fossil, extractive economic and growth model, which by its 
nature is expansive and on which China's own economic rise is 
also based. By giving Chinese corporations access to fossil energy 
sources outside the country and to other raw materials, which are 
still necessary, and by opening up a kind of new colonies of com-
modities, China is promoting its own economic structural change 
and strengthening its international competitiveness. 
Investors are also penetrating ever deeper into ecologically ex-
tremely sensitive regions such as the Arctic, where 30 per cent of 
the world's gas reserves, oil and other mineral resources are be-
lieved to be located. In eastern Siberia, environmentally damag-
ing large dams are helping to replace electricity from fossil fuels 
in China. Economic corridors are opening up forest areas for legal 
and illegal logging for the processing industry in China, while at 
home the government initiated intensive reforestation and forest 
protection. Raw material extraction and large dams are particu-
larly often accompanied with serious human rights violations. The 
more remote the region, the more authoritarian the government, 
the more difficult it is for civil society organisations or environ-
mentalists to exercise control and for local populations to defend 
themselves against projects and their consequences. 
For Chinese companies engaged in extractive industries such 
as forestry and mining abroad, which are not considered exem-
plary in terms of respect for environmental and living conditions 
or political and social rights, there are now ecological and social 
guidelines for lending by banks. However, their implementation 
is largely left to the companies themselves. The only reference to 
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the environment issue in such a central document like „Vision 
and Actions“ says, „we should promote ecological progress (...) 
and join hands to make the Silk Road an environment-friendly 
one“. The „Belt and Road Ecological and Environmental Cooper-
ation Plan“, issued by the Ministry of Environmental Protection 
(MEP) in May 2017, promises that B&R „will inject an effective 
impetus to accomplishment of environmental targets in the 2030 
Agenda for Sustainable Development in the countries along the 
routes.“ The instruments to identify and minimize environmen-
tal risks from major projects remain rather vague, and the Min-
istry itself has a weak standing when it comes to controlling Chi-
nese companies abroad. 
A comparison between the policies in China itself and the envi-
ronmental standards currently applied to projects abroad there-
fore "indicates a growing schism" (Tracy, et al 2017: 58). At home, 
China has introduced elements of ecological modernisation, es-
pecially in industries that are exposed to market competition 
from Western countries or in expanding economic sectors such 
as renewable energies. „Yet it is ‚racing to the bottom’ in terms 
of trans-boundary and overseas development projects involving 
non-Western countries from which China derives a large share 
of its natural resources". While structural change and the legiti-
macy of the State and the Party require greater consideration of 
environmental issues and green growth, such barriers are largely 
lacking abroad. Instruments such as the Green Silk Road Fund, 
which is intended to promote ecological projects such as affores-
tation and solar and wind energy in economic corridors, are of 
little help against these fundamental contradictions.
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Sukhgerel Dugersuren
"Mongolia has missed the opportunity for an alternative de-
velopment path"
Uwe Hoering: What role does B&R play for development in Mon-
golia, especially with regard to the exploitation of natural re-
sources?
Sukhgerel Dugersuren: Coal is one of the most important ex-
port goods to China. But since China wants to reduce its CO2 
emissions, coal is now being burned in Mongolia and the elec-
tricity is being exported to China. One example is the Baganuur 
power plant of a joint venture registered in Mongolia. The con-
tracts signed in 2015 show that the electricity is not intended for 
Mongolia: high-voltage lines lead to China, and the price of elec-
tricity is too high for people in Mongolia. But civil society organ-
isations did not receive this information from official sources 
until months after the contract was signed. Air pollution in Ul-
aanbaatar is a real health hazard, said the representative of the 
UNICEF children's aid in Mongolia. But China has no problem 
building a coal-fired power plant here.
What experiences has Mongolia had in the past with Chinese ex-
tractive investments, also in comparison with Western investors?
A common problem with Chinese investment in Mongolia 
is that companies do not adhere to international standards for 
publishing information or public participation in decision-mak-
ing. Even the most basic information about Chinese companies 
such as the name of the parent company, address, contact per-
son or information about their business is not available. It is clear 
that Mongolia is primarily a source of raw materials for China. 
Western companies have a slightly better information policy, but 
apart from that they hardly differ from Chinese companies in 
terms of environmental damage, adverse social impact or com-
pensation. Only projects such as Oyu Tolgoi, which have received 
high public and international attention not least through civil so-
ciety organisations, try to comply with international standards.
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The Chinese government promises to commit companies to strict 
environmental and social standards and to cooperate with civil 
society organizations (CSOs). Are there any sign of this in Mon-
golia?
There is no indication of any improvement in this area, as there 
is strong resistance from Chinese companies. They are known for 
using the most polluting technologies, not repairing damage and 
simply disappearing when authorities want to hold them account-
able. Attempts by civil society organisations such as Oyu Tolgoi 
Watch to speak with representatives of Baganuur Power LLC or 
the Chinese embassy in Mongolia have also been unsuccessful. 
We do not see any willingness beyond general declarations of in-
tent to comply with international standards or to cooperate with 
civil society organisations.
The same applies to the experiences of CSOs in other countries 
in the region: There are no signs that Chinese companies are ad-
hering to stricter environmental and social standards. On the con-
trary, our partners observing Chinese companies in Central Asia 
find that they are not implementing the voluntary guidelines of the 
Beijing government and the Asian Investment Bank AIIB, which 
promise "green and responsible financing". This may be due to lack 
of capacity and experience. But it is also known from other parts 
of the world that Chinese foreign investment has so far been in-
different to the environmental and social impacts of its activities. 
It would therefore be interesting to hear what lies behind the an-
nouncement that Chinese companies will work with CSOs in the 
future to review the implementation of commitments. So far this 
is just a rumour, not a fact. And even then, a limited review by 
grassroots organisations in Mongolia is possible. But the conse-
quences depend on the regulatory framework. And I do not see 
how improvements can be achieved given the mix of weak regu-
lation and corrupt practices.
Does China's strong economic influence have an impact on Mon-
golian politics and democratic procedures?
China was and is the largest investor in Mongolia. Official in-
formation about B&R investment is scarce, and that only about 
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older projects such as Baganuur, which are now receiving a cap-
ital injection. In April 2018, the new Prime Minister Khurelsukh 
Ulhnaa signed a cooperation agreement with China on 36 pro-
jects worth $ 4.6 billion. I fear that Mongolia will become so 
indebted that it will lose its economic sovereignty and thus its 
political sovereignty. The kowtowing to Beijing after the Da-
lai Lama's visit to Mongolia is proof of this. And I think the op-
portunity for an alternative, more independent development 
path was missed in the mid-1990s, when the "Gold rush" be-
gan with extractivism as the basis for economic development. 
If we look at our neighbours in Central Asia or South Asia, who 
have been in debt to China Eximbank for decades: what happens 
if they can not pay them off? In the worst-case scenario, over-in-
debtedness can render a sovereign government incapable of ac-
tion. And the mix of dubious deals with Chinese companies and 
corruption could reinforce the rejection of liberal democracies 
that we still have.
Sukhgerel Dugersuren is the director of the OT Watch and Riv-
ers without Boundaries Coalition-Mongolia, two organizations 
that promote effective environmental and social standards in 
mining projects.
6. Top dog in Southeast Asia
For decades, the conflict in the South China Sea over territorial 
claims has burdened relations between China and other riparian 
states. The USA is also involved as an ally of the Philippines and 
other countries. Direct confrontations repeatedly arise in the dis-
pute over "freedom of the seas" and control over resources. The 
region plays a key role both geopolitically and for the maritime 
Silk Road. The sea route through the territorial sea of Southeast 
Asia and the bottleneck of the Strait of Malacca between the Ma-
lay Peninsula and Sumatra is the main route for goods exports and 
raw material imports such as oil from the Gulf States and Africa. 
For the south-western Chinese provinces of Yunnan and Guangxi, 
ports such as Haiphong in Vietnam and Singapore, new ferry con-
nections and modernisation of ports in Indonesia open up the 
prospect of extending their connections into the Pacific region. 
With a whole range of development promises, diplomacy and mil-
itary threats, Beijing seeks to reconcile political and economic in-
terests and use B&R as a peace project. It can build on the fact that 
China is already economically more dominant in Southeast Asia 
than in any other region of the world. For many countries, from 
Myanmar to the Philippines, Laos to Indonesia, it is the most im-
portant trading partner. Chinese companies invest in plantations 
and factories, infrastructure projects are financed with Chinese 
development funds and loans.
Connect and integrate
With the Silk Road Initiative, China offers the ten member coun-
tries of ASEAN, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, syn-
ergy effects with their own development plans. Long before B&R, 
they started systematically expanding the infrastructure. To-
gether with the Asian Development Bank (ADB), the economic co-
operation programme for the Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS) 
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has driven the expansion of roads, railway lines, waterways and 
airports, energy supply and telecommunications.1 Milestones in-
cluded several "friendship bridges" across the Mekong river, which 
crosses the region from northwest to southeast as a lifeline and 
natural barrier: one of these was completed in December 2013 in 
the Thailand-Laos-Myanmar country triangle and closed the gap 
for a continuous road connection from Kunming, the capital of 
Yunnan province, to Bangkok. In 2013, the member states and the 
ADB, which houses the GMS Secretariat, decided on a financing 
framework of $ 50 billion for a period of ten years for the further 
expansion and settlement of industry and agricultural enterprises. 
The Master Plan for ASEAN connectivity of 2010 formu-
lates similar goals. As with the GMS programme, money for 
this comes from the ADB and Japan. In addition to the other 
ASEAN members Indonesia, Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei and 
Singapore, the Chinese provinces Yunnan and Guangxi are 
also involved. The accelerated expansion of infrastructure and 
economic corridors is intended to promote the ASEAN Eco-
nomic Community founded in 2015 into an independent, inte-
grated common economic area and growth market along Eu-
ropean lines and make it more attractive for foreign investors. 
Despite these billion-dollar programmes, many governments wel-
come B&R because there are still major infrastructure gaps and 
considerable investment needs for economic development. The 
funds from the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), 
the Silk Road Fund and Chinese state banks promise an addi-
tional boost in financing. A showcase for the cooperation is the 
continuous high-speed train connection between Kunming via 
Vientiane in Laos and Bangkok in Thailand to Singapore, the 
trade and finance metropolis at the southern tip of the Malay-
sian peninsula, for which the table was set in late 2017 after sev-
1 Loans and grants for these came mainly from the ADB and bilateral 
donors such as Japan, which in turn were intended to bring private com-
panies and investors on board. "The GMS has, in a sense, “pioneered” 
region-wide PPPs whereby private sector revenues have been enabled 
through public financing", says a Focus on the Global South study on in-
vestment in the Mekong region (Guttal/Chrek 2016: 13).
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eral delays due to domestic power struggles in Thailand (Schaf-
far 2015). At the Silk Road Summit in May 2017, many heads 
of state and government from Southeast Asia were present. 
But the assessments of Chinese influence vary widely in the region 
(Chan 2016). In the hope of development progress, particularly 
poorer countries such as Cambodia and Laos are showing them-
selves to be enthusiastic supporters, as is Thailand, which wants to 
further expand its position as the hub of the Mekong region. Cam-
bodia is an example of how connectivity has many dimensions be-
yond infrastructure and business relations. Especially the young 
generation is courted and familiarized with Chinese culture and 
way of thinking. With scholarships, training opportunities and 
language courses in China, the impression is created that China 
offers benevolent support in many ways, while Chinese influ-
ences simultaneously conquer consumption, work and way of life. 
Countries such as Malaysia and Singapore, which are not depend-
ent on Chinese development funds hope above all for a further 
economic boost, for example for the port of Singapore. They tend 
to adopt a wait-and-see, cautiously optimistic attitude. Indonesia, 
the world's largest island nation, expects China to support its own 
plans to become a global maritime hub at the interface between 
the Pacific Ocean and the Indian Ocean through the expansion of 
shipping routes, the modernisation of ports and the shipyard in-
dustry. Reservations come mainly from Myanmar and Vietnam, 
where the rejection of Chinese influence is particularly strong, and 
until recently from the Philippines, which have massive conflicts 
with Beijing over fishing rights and territorial claims.
Securing claims
In addition to the Philippines, Indonesia, Vietnam and other 
riparian countries of the South China Sea, which has a simi-
lar significance for them as the Mediterranean Sea for Europe, 
are also at odds with China over ownership claims. For it is not 
just a question of trade routes, but also of resources. The fish-
ing grounds provide an estimated 10 per cent of the world's an-
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nual catch, but are overfished and therefore aggressively con-
tested. The Philippine and Indonesian coastguards regularly 
bring in Chinese trawlers, while Indonesia, the second larg-
est fish producer in the world, declared the fight against "il-
legal" fishing a political priority. Furthermore, significant de-
posits of oil, natural gas, ore and other mineral resources are 
suspected under the seabed. There are differing legal views on 
who controls these sea routes and can claim access to resources. 
China claims most of the South China Sea as its territorial waters. 
On the one hand, it refers to customary rights, such as in fish-
ing, but also to historical ownership claims. They are marked by 
the so-called Nine-Dash Line, a rather sketchy demarcation that 
reaches far into the Exclusive Economic Zones of the other ripar-
ian states. But the 1982 United Nations International Conven-
tion on the Law of the Sea gives riparian states the right to use all 
sub-surface resources in an area of up to 200 nautical miles off 
their coasts. Irrespective of this, the seas are regarded as inter-
national waters that can be navigated by ships from all countries. 
The more emphatically China asserted its claims in recent years, 
the more frequently the opposing legal approaches led to threat-
ening gestures, mutual provocations, but also to armed confronta-
tions. Vietnam, the Philippines and China set up military bases on 
disputed islands, reefs, atolls and sandbanks were piled up in order 
to justify territorial claims with the artificial new land. Again, the 
tactic of the Go game is used to move the status quo stone by stone. 
Especially with Vietnam, there were repeated military conflicts. 
Already in 1974 the Chinese People's Liberation Army occupied 
the Paracel Islands claimed by Vietnam. In mid-2014, accompa-
nied by nationalist campaigns and demonstrations on both sides, 
a confrontation escalated over an oilrig in Vietnam's economic 
zone. The widespread mistrust of China in Vietnam is further 
ascribed to painful experiences with Chinese investments in the 
past (China programs et al. 2017: 29-32), which also apply simi-
larly to other countries: Chinese companies use their position to 
win contracts, deliver poor quality and cause environmental dam-
age. Vietnam's trade deficit and high levels of debt could continue 
to grow, the exploitation of natural resources could increase and 
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its own economic position in the region could be weakened, be-
cause the spoke structure of Chinese planning would make trade 
more focused on China.
In view of the Chinese salami tactics and the complicated le-
gal situation, the government of the Philippines sought help from 
the International Court of Arbitration in The Hague. It decided in 
July 2016 that most of China's claims were not covered by the In-
ternational Convention and violated the sovereignty of the Philip-
pines. Beijing promptly declared that it would not accept the ver-
dict and thus withdrew from international law and jurisdiction.
Build dependency
China is also subtly using its power in the Mekong region. Nu-
merous megaprojects in the water and energy sector have been 
built on the upper reaches of the river, which has its source in 
the Tibetan highlands and is called Lancang in China. Many 
others in Laos, Cambodia and Thailand have been co-financed 
and co-built. In Laos, which wants to become the "battery" of 
Southeast Asia and earn money with electricity exports, al-
most half of all Chinese foreign direct investments flow into en-
ergy-related projects. "Water diplomacy based on asymmetric 
geographical power and hydropower FDI have become new for-
eign policy instruments for Beijing" (Brauer/Kliem 2017: 55). 
By creating facts on the upper reaches of the river, the coun-
tries on the lower reaches of the river can be turned off the pro-
verbial tap. In Laos, Thailand, Cambodia and Vietnam, where 
the Mekong finally flows into the South China Sea in a huge 
delta, the river provides the livelihood for 60 million people. 
It supplies fish and water for agriculture, especially in Cam-
bodia and Vietnam, which is one of the largest rice produc-
ers and exporters. It is the transport route and lifeline for one 
of the biologically richest and most fertile regions in the world. 
Pianporn Deetes, campaign coordinator of the environmental 
lobby group International Rivers, complains that the dams in the 
upper reaches of the river dramatically interfere with the natural 
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alternation of flooding and dry season, block the transport of sed-
iments and drastically change the ecosystem for the lower reaches 
of the river. International standards for the assessment, preven-
tion or reduction of social and environmental impacts were not 
met in the construction of these dams. Fluctuating water levels 
and water shortages are particularly felt in Cambodia and Viet-
nam. During a severe drought in Vietnam in 2016, Chinese author-
ities demonstrated their power and hesitated long before opening 
a dam. The dispute over the use of the Mekong River thus becomes 
another source of conflict next to the South China Sea. And the 
dam disaster in Laos in August 2018, inundating many remote 
villages in Cambodia too, has cast a long, dark shadow of doubt 
about the safety standards and viability of these projects and the 
pressure by the Lao government arguing hydropower could lift 
the country out of poverty.
Regional organizations such as the Mekong River Commis-
sion can do little about the dam construction hype because they 
have hardly any enforcement powers and are chronically un-
derfunded. Above all, China is not involved in the joint com-
missions of the other countries, or merely as a dialogue part-
ner, and is therefore not bound by their decisions. "If Beijing 
succeeds in taking control of the development of the Mekong it 
would quickly become a crucial artery for China’s further rise 
and influence in ASEAN," says political scientist Elliot Brennan. 
Promise development prospects
Inspired by the B&R money from China and the partnership nar-
rative, however, the willingness to be a good neighbour and to 
cooperate has apparently gained the upper hand. Diplomatic ne-
gotiations and the establishment of new institutions are now be-
ing used as instruments of peace and friendship from the stra-
tegic repertoire and linked to development promises. With the 
Lancang-Mekong Cooperation agreement on closer cooper-
ation on the extension of dams and water management, which 
was agreed in 2015, Beijing created an institutional alternative 
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to existing Mekong organisations. At the end of 2017, a draft 
five-year plan was presented to promote better transport links, 
industrial development and economic cooperation, agricul-
tural and poverty reduction projects. As an incentive for the re-
gion, the Chinese government promised around $ 11.5 billion. 
The co-operation announcements can be seen as a contribution to 
transforming the region from a field of conflict to a trial ground 
for the Chinese government's ideas of peaceful development 
in mutual interest. Dam projects as renewable energy sources 
also fit in with the environmental image of the Silk Road Initi-
ative, even if this threatens to lead to large-scale resettlement. 
As on the Mekong, Beijing also plays out the temptations of B&R in 
the conflict in the South China Sea. Following a visit by Philippine 
President Duterte to China in October 2016, agreements worth $ 
24 billion were concluded - for infrastructure measures, invest-
ments and weapons. Despite his success in The Hague, Duterte 
was now satisfied with vague promises of talks and became the 
"mouthpiece of Beijing" with regard to the conflicts around the 
South China Sea, as Forbes magazine noted. His face vault over 
an important issue of national sovereignty led to widespread dis-
content in the Philippines itself. Even Vietnam, which supplies 
coal and oil to China in exchange for steel and machinery for its 
industrialisation, can hardly afford to escalate the conflicts due 
to its close economic ties and is seeking cooperation. In Novem-
ber 2017, governments agreed not to do anything to aggravate the 
conflict and to work together with the other ASEAN countries 
on an agreement for a Code of Conduct in the South China Sea. 
Xi Jinping has been courting the region since 2013. Shortly after 
his opening speech for the "Trans European land bridge" in Ka-
zakhstan's capital Astana, he presented the idea of  the maritime 
Silk Road in Indonesia's capital Jakarta. While in Astana Zhang 
Qian, the special ambassador of the imperial court, was invoked 
as the historical forerunner of the Silk Road, it was the navigator 
icon Admiral Zheng He who had made several stops in Indonesia 
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during his expeditions in the 15th century.2 If there the "Belt" was 
inaugurated, here it was the "Road". And as in Astana, Jakarta 
was about friendship and mutual benefit, now between China 
and ASEAN. Since then, it has apparently been possible to inte-
grate even determined opponents, at least temporarily, by creat-
ing a win-win narrative and skilfully interweaving economic in-
terests and regional geopolitics. Diplomatic victory on points: The 
paralysis of ASEAN when it comes to criticizing Beijing's policies. 
Nevertheless, the population and governments still have reserva-
tions about China's growing dominance. In June 2018, widespread 
protests in Vietnam against new Special Economic Zones high-
lighted anti-Chinese sentiments and dissatisfaction with corrup-
tion and the government’s weak response to China’s violations of 
Vietnam’s sovereignty in the resource-rich sea. Later that summer, 
the new Malaysian government under Prime Minister Mahathir 
Mohamad suspended China-backed railways and pipeline pro-
jects worth more than $ 20 billion, which had been agreed upon 
by the former government of Najib Razak, complaining that costs 
were inflated. It is feared that the Silk Road Initiative will not only 
strengthen political and economic dependencies at the national 
level, but also displace regional development concepts such as the 
expansion of the Economic Community. Most ASEAN countries 
therefore do not want China to be their exclusive partner, said 
former Singapore Foreign Minister George Yeo at a meeting of 
the Davos World Economic Forum in Cambodia in May 2017, but 
prefer to remain "promiscuous". This opens up opportunities for 
them to play off the various powerful neighbours, such as China, 
Japan, India and the US, which compete for supremacy, against 
each other and to preserve their own leeway.
2 For a more differentiated view of B&R's two alleged ancestors, see 
Tansen Sen (2014): Silk Road Diplomacy - Twists, Turns and Distor-
ted History.
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Showing the flag
However, a potentially much more explosive conflict continues 
to smoulder. In 2010, US Secretary of State Hilary Clinton reaf-
firmed that free navigation and the application of international 
law are in the "national interest" of the United States. US war-
ships regularly patrol the region in the name of "open sea routes" 
and conduct military manoeuvres with allies. In contrast, Bei-
jing insists on its territorial claims and tries to control ship-
ping in the Chinese Sea. Chinese government representatives 
are said to have made it clear to US interlocutors that the posi-
tion was non-negotiable, comparable to China's claim to sover-
eignty over Taiwan and Tibet. And it's about more than control 
over trade routes and resources: Hainan, the southern Chinese is-
land in the Gulf of Tonkin not far from the Vietnamese Northern 
coast, is the headquarters of the Chinese Southern Fleet, which 
is being upgraded with submarines and aircraft carriers. And 
their access to the Pacific leads through the South China Sea. 
While the political statements on both sides tend to show restraint, 
the US military-industrial complex apparently relies on an inten-
sification of the conflict. Forbes magazine reports in August 2017 
that General Dynamics, Northrop Grumman, Raytheon and oth-
ers are opening new offices in the region: “These defence giants 
are positioning themselves for a piece of the greatest arms races 
since World War II, one that’s just getting started".
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Wolfram Schaffar
"The idea of  democracy has been discredited"
Uwe Hoering: B&R co-operates remarkably often with authori-
tarian regimes, in Southeast Asia, including Thailand, Laos and 
the Philippines. Is there a connection, a special affinity to au-
thoritarianism?
Wolfram Schaffar: The findings are even more dramatic: Not 
only does the Chinese government cooperate with authoritarian 
regimes at B&R. The examples of Thailand and the Philippines 
suggest that B&R is even bringing about authoritarian regimes. 
One of the reasons for the coup d'état in Thailand in 2014 was that 
royalist conservative elites wanted to secure access to and control 
over the planning of the new high-speed railway lines. Since then, 
a military government has ruled there with an iron fist. In the 
Philippines, President Duterte is another example for this new au-
thoritarianism. Since his election in 2016, he became infamously 
known for approving more than ten thousand extrajudicial kill-
ings of alleged drug dealers. Both countries were formerly close 
economic and military cooperation partners of the USA - the es-
tablishment of authoritarian regimes coincided with a distancing 
from the USA and a turn towards China. However, the example of 
Thailand also shows that Beijing does not necessarily exert direct 
political influence, since the coup d'état in Thailand was deter-
mined by internal Thai factors. Yet, China does not seem to have 
any ideological concerns and cooperates with the military govern-
ment just as closely as with its democratically elected predecessor.
If B&R at least does not directly promote authoritarian regimes 
- where does its attractiveness come from?
The democratic systems that have been implemented in numer-
ous transition countries in the post-Soviet region and, since the 
1990s, in Southeast Asian countries, usually follow a liberal-dem-
ocratic blueprint of checks-and-balances along US lines. For years, 
the governments of these countries have pushed through neo-lib-
eral reforms and a strict austerity policy against all odds. The re-
sulting social upheavals have not only caused democratisation pro-
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cesses to fail, but have also discredited the idea of  democracy itself. 
The attractiveness of the Chinese development model lies in the 
fact that its investments represent an alternative to this neo-lib-
eral austerity policy. It is a new utopia that promises an improve-
ment in living conditions on the basis of economic growth. Against 
the background of decades of neoliberal neglect of infrastructure 
and social systems, this sounds like a promise of salvation. How-
ever, the fact that a new round of global growth within planetary 
boundaries is not possible is all but ignored.
So China offers an alternative to the hitherto very pronounced 
orientation towards Western-liberal role models, at least in some 
countries?
China is actually propagating a new model of order. However, it 
remains to be seen whether it has a different quality. That seems 
questionable. China has always insisted that the Silk Road is just 
an initiative, not an integrated project, not a Marshall plan, not 
a geostrategic project. However, this argument is becoming in-
creasingly fragile: with increasing military activity presence, a 
geostrategy is increasingly shimmering through that comes very 
close to a new Marshall Plan. And with the investment bank AIIB 
(Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank), similar financial struc-
tures have been created to those already in place with the World 
Bank and other development banks.
What social forces are supporting this shift towards China and 
its model of order?
That is a central question, because this global reorientation 
by China needs a hegemonic embedding and safeguarding. Just 
as the Marshall Plan after World War II in Europe not only mil-
itarily secured the ties to the West, but also through the cultural 
anchoring of an American way of life - pop music, cinema, etc. 
- became the Leitkultur and shaped our consumption patterns. 
In the same way, we experience that China also assumes a cultural 
leadership function and secures it with projects: China supports 
the spread of Chinese culture and language worldwide through 
cultural institutions like the Confucius Institutes. Foreigners who 
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speak Chinese well and who praise China's achievements, culture, 
etc., appear again and again in the Chinese media. In many neigh-
bouring countries, which we have mentioned, a real China boom 
can be observed. However, there is another phenomenon to men-
tion here: In Thailand and the Philippines the politically influen-
tial middle classes and the economically strong upper class con-
sist of overseas Chinese. They immigrated to Southeast Asia in 
different waves, partly supported by colonial powers. They were 
often the target of persecution, pogroms, and xenophobia, but 
have also acculturated as in Thailand and the Philippines. More 
recently, however, these classes have turned to China and their 
Chinese roots. It is not simply a matter of rediscovering old con-
nections - it is a new phenomenon that successfully ties in with 
these historical family roots.
So, do we see a general spread of new authoritarianism in 
Asia, where the Silk Roads are one of the factors?
There are also countries that show the opposite tendency: Ne-
pal, Bhutan, South Korea, Mongolia, and Taiwan. All these coun-
tries have in common that democratic forms of government have 
been deepened in recent years - not necessarily according to a 
Western model, but fought for through difficult conflict-laden 
processes. In Taiwan, a free trade agreement with China led to 
the occupation of parliament, and the question of Taiwan’s au-
tonomy and independence was openly discussed. In Korea, so-
cial movements have succeeded in removing an authoritarian 
head of government from office. And in Bhutan, the government 
is consistently pursuing a development path that is not one-sid-
edly oriented towards economic growth. Parts of these processes 
are debates about alternatives to the Chinese authoritarian path 
– without, however, copying a Western neoliberal paradigm. We 
in Europe should study these processes, in which new paths are 
taken in a critical confrontation with both Western and Chinese 
development visions, very carefully - because we are facing the 
same challenges. 
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7. China rule the waves
The Humen Bridge over the Pearl River Delta, completed in 1997, 
is one of the early monuments to China's rise to economic power. 
Over four and a half kilometres long, with a main span of al-
most 900 meters and headroom of 60 meters, it was the first 
large suspension bridge independently built by Chinese engi-
neers and workers. Its design and dimensions are somewhat 
reminiscent of those of the Golden Gate Bridge. The trans-
port link shortens the distance between Hong Kong, the Shen-
zhen Economic Zone and the metropolis of Guangzhou by 120 
kilometres and contributed significantly to the development 
of the Pearl River Delta into the first Chinese powerhouse. 
The Pearl River Delta was also an important site for the so-
called Opium Wars in the mid-19th century. British gunboats de-
stroyed the Chinese fleet and brutally forced the empire to aban-
don its isolation and, among other things, to allow British trade 
in opium. The defeat and the "unequal treaties" mark the begin-
ning of the "century of humiliation" of China by the seafaring 
colonial powers. Not far from the bridge, a museum with large 
murals and groups of figures glorifying the heroic but futile re-
sistance keeps alive the memory of shame. But a large photo-
graph also shows China's bold leap in time when it joined the 
World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001. The message: We are 
back and taking up the competition in global trade and indus-
trial development, i.e., in the field in which the Western pow-
ers have so far reshaped the world according to their rules. 
One instrument in this competition is the "Maritime Silk Road of 
the 21st Century", which President Xi Jinping announced during 
his speech in the Indonesian capital Jakarta in October 2013. As 
a counterpart to the transport links and economic corridors on 
the land route, the important, busy shipping routes and ports be-
tween China, Africa and Europe are to be further expanded and 
the presence of Chinese companies strengthened.
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Admiral Zheng He is needed again
Xi Jinping thus directly linked up with the glorious past of the em-
pire long before the humiliation. Four hundred years before the 
Opium Wars, China had the largest and most modern fleet in the 
world. Compared to the junks with a length of more than 120 meters, 
the ships of Columbus look like nutshells. The nautical knowledge 
was highly developed. With 60 ships and 30,000 men, the impe-
rial fleet led by Admiral Zheng He carried out several expeditions 
in Southeast Asia and the Indian Ocean and sailed as far as Arabia, 
the Persian Gulf and the east coast of Africa. Partly they were recon-
naissance trips, partly they served to secure trade routes against 
pirates, and partly they were also power demonstrations, by which 
afflicted regions became tributary or as in Vietnam and Ceylon, 
today's Sri Lanka, empire-friendly governors were established. 
But in the second third of the 15th century there was a major 
turnaround with far-reaching consequences. The Middle King-
dom withdrew into extensive isolation and left the oceans to the 
emerging and expanding Western colonial powers. Admiral Zheng 
He fell from grace, the ocean-going ships were destroyed, the con-
struction plans destroyed, the expeditions deleted from the his-
tory books. For some years now, Zheng He has again been proudly 
presented in state propaganda as the personification of China's 
maritime greatness. Not as campaigns of conquest, but as cul-
tivation  of friendly relations with other countries, his journeys 
are praised - a nimbus that the new Silk Roads now also claim. 
The Western dominance of the past centuries was essentially 
based on the control of navigation (Bhardwaj 2015: 10). Econom-
ically, China has long since broken this dominance and made up 
for the disgrace of forced trade liberalisation. With the maritime 
Silk Road, it is now also returning to its former greatness as a naval 
power and builds on the great past of the Empire. It thus disputes 
the Christian seafaring nations and strives for the signum and the 
basis of power of the British Empire - "Britannia rule the waves". 
As early as 2015, three of the twelve largest container-shipping com-
panies were Chinese, including the China Ocean Shipping Com-
pany (COSCO). China's merchant navy is the largest in the world 
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and it continues to grow: China now has the world's most modern 
shipyard industry, with COSCO's subsidiaries among the most im-
portant shipyard operators. In 2013, almost every second container 
ship in the world was launched in China. In addition, there is the 
largest deep-sea fishing fleet, which is active on all seas, including 
in the rich fishing grounds off the coast of West Africa, and which 
repeatedly makes negative headlines for illegal fishing practices. 
The deep crisis in merchant shipping due to the financial cri-
sis, stagnating world trade and overcapacity, of which the Ko-
rean shipping company Hanjin was the most prominent victim 
in 2016, is driving forward a concentration process and the con-
struction of ever-larger container ships. As a result, Chinese ship-
ping companies became even more important. A consortium of 
four shipping companies, including COSCO, accounts for 40 per 
cent of transpacific trade and 35 per cent of trade between Europe 
and Asia. Under the headline "Container Attack from China", the 
Handelsblatt reported in July 2017 that COSCO had become the 
third-largest shipping company after the Danish industry leader 
AP Moller-Maersk and the Mediterranean Shipping Company 
(MSC) from Switzerland by taking over Orient Overseas Con-
tainer Line based in Hong Kong.
A bride in every harbour
Global foreign trade of the world's largest trading nation is mainly 
conducted by sea. It is therefore hardly surprising that seven of the 
top ten ports, led by Shanghai, are located in China. In the global 
infrastructure competition, modern ports are becoming increas-
ingly important as transhipment hubs between container ships, 
smaller ships operating on regional or upstream routes, roads, 
rail pipelines, and as fuel depots and locations for shipping ser-
vices. This is why Chinese port operators and shipping compa-
nies are also increasingly active abroad, setting their Go stones 
around the China Sea, the Indian Ocean, the Horn of Africa and 
the Red Sea on the Suez Canal all the way to Piraeus and other 
ports in the Mediterranean. But they also anchor around Africa 
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along the Atlantic coast to Zeebrugge (Breuer 2017). They also in-
vest in inland ports such as Khorgos on the Sino-Kazakh border. 
This means that groups such as China Merchant's Port Holdings 
(CMPort), China's largest global port operator, and COSCO, are 
also hot on the heels of European competitor Moller-Maersk, 
which has shares in over 70 ports in around 40 countries, and 
MSC. However, while the other large shipping companies usually 
only own or operate only terminals and ports, China is also invest-
ing in adjacent free trade and special economic zones, in which 
Chinese companies in turn produce, and offer access to modern-
ised transport routes to the hinterland. The countries are thus of-
fered a whole development package. In addition, COSCO and CM-
Port not only act according to economic logic, but also coordinate 
their activities with government policies. Wade Shepard quotes 
CMPort director Bai Jintao, "Our development plan mirrors One 
Belt One Road, and this is the primary driver of our expansion 
strategy." As a war chest, COSCO has been granted a financing 
framework of $ 26 billion by the China Development Bank. This 
gives Chinese companies significant competitive advantages over 
companies from other countries, which are far more reluctant to 
invest in view of possible risks and uncertain return prospects.
Taking hold of the "Shining pearl"
According to the Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi, Sri Lanka 
is a "shining pearl on the maritime Silk Road". The admiration 
is probably less due to the beauty of the island as for its cen-
tral location in the Indian Ocean, halfway between China, the 
Middle East and Africa. Colombo is one of the most impor-
tant ports and transhipment points in South Asia. The his-
toric Admiral Zheng He made several stops here on his expe-
ditions, and in Galle, in the south of the island, there is a stone 
tablet commemorating this in Chinese, Tamil and Persian. 
Already under the former president Mahinda Rajapaksa, who 
due to his authoritarian-dictatorial politics found otherwise lit-
tle foreign support for the reconstruction of the country after 
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the long civil war, China generously provided funds. These funds 
were mainly used for prestige projects such as the expansion of 
Colombo Port City near the capital, which was started in 2011, 
pushed by a $ 1.4 billion loan and carried out by the construction 
company China Communications Construction Company, which 
was blacklisted by the World Bank for corruption. On a large land 
reclamation an international financial centre with malls, hotels, 
blocks of flats, schools and hospitals will be build. It is touted as 
the upcoming hub for trade and financial services between Singa-
pore, Dubai and Africa. Further billion euro loans went to Mattala 
International Airport including a conference centre and cricket 
ground and another deep-sea port in Hambantota , completed in 
2011, on the southeast coast.
The port of Hambantota, in which hardly any ships dock, with 
its adjacent 2000-hectare investment zone remained a "white el-
ephant". At Mattala Airport too, hardly any planes land or take 
off. The dredging work for Colombo Port City led to fierce pro-
tests by environmentalists and fishermen who saw their fishing 
grounds and livelihoods threatened. Along with allegations of mis-
management and corruption, they contributed to the removal of 
President Rajapaksa in 2015. The winner Ranil Wickremesinghe 
fulfilled his campaign promise and, after taking office, put the 
construction of the port city on hold.
But the new, democratic government had done the math with-
out the Chinese. The construction stop had to be lifted after a few 
months because the Chinese construction company threatened 
to demand compensation. The country’s high debts to Chinese 
donors do not leave much room for manoeuvre. When the Inter-
national Monetary Fund (IMF) called for privatisation as a pre-
condition for a new financial aid package, Chinese investors were 
ready. In July 2017, CMPort, which already operates the port in Co-
lombo, took over 80 per cent of the shares in the port of Hamban-
tota for $ 1.12 billion ("debt-to-equity swap") and thus went from 
service provider to owner. "We need to have a global player direct-
ing ships, services and investments," says Sri Lanka Port Authority 
Chairman Parakrama Dissanayake, justifying the privatisation. 
To this end, CMPort promised further investments. The invest-
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ment zone is to be expanded by thousands of hectares, which will 
inevitably lead to displacement of the local population. Energy 
companies such as Sinopec and China Petroleum have announced 
plans to build large fuel depots. Hang Tian,  manager of the port 
operator CMPort, already envisions Hambantota as the future hub 
for trade between China and East Africa, which, according to him, 
is on its way to becoming another global workbench.
Does the flag follow the trade?
Sri Lanka is only one of the pearls collected by the descend-
ants of Admiral Zheng He around the Indian Ocean. In My-
anmar, the port of Kyaukpyu is already a transhipment point 
for oil and gas pipelines to the south-western Chinese prov-
ince of Yunnan and is to be developed into a huge special eco-
nomic zone. Gwadar in Pakistan is the hub for the economic 
corridor with Western China, ports in Bangladesh and the 
Maldives are being considered or already under construction. 
This string of pearls is arousing fears among the neighbouring 
states that it could be used to strangle them. With growing con-
trol by Chinese port operators, shipping companies and logis-
tics companies, China is not only securing its own supply and 
distribution channels. As an "infrastructure empire" it can also 
control the supply chains of other countries, at least using its 
strong economic position to its own benefit and to the detriment 
of the riparian states. India, which regards the Indian Ocean 
as its extended territorial waters and zone of influence, is par-
ticularly alarmed by the activities at its doorsteps. In order not 
to leave the field entirely to the Chinese, Indian investors want 
to take over the loss-making Mattala airport and negotiate a 
presence in the port of Trincomalee on Sri Lanka's east coast. 
The possibility of military dual use of ports, merchant ships and 
logistics is also a cause of concern for a pearl necklace offen-
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sive.1 Although New Delhi's border conflicts with Beijing are 
fought far north in the Himalayas, China and India's arch-en-
emy Pakistan have been working closely together militarily for 
decades. Other countries, such as Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Iran 
are also intensifying their presence in the region. India has be-
come the largest importer of military equipment, according to 
the latest report by the peace research institute SIPRI. Austral-
ian security analyst David Brewster warned in the journal The 
Diplomat that the Indian Ocean, which had hitherto been less 
affected by geopolitical rivalries, was heading "towards a much 
more multipolar and complex strategic environment." This de-
velopment was given a new dynamic by the Silk Road Initia-
tive and the competition between India and China: "It seems 
as if we are in the middle of a base race in the Indian Ocean". 
The Chinese Navy, which is increasingly being expanded and up-
graded, recently got its first base in the region, alongside the bases 
of the United States, France and the United Kingdom. Warships 
have been stationed in Djibouti at the Horn of Africa for several 
years now, based on their involvement in the fight against pi-
racy. In July 2017, the base was upgraded to a military base in 
order to serve as a logistics centre for the support of UN peace-
keeping mission in Africa, according to the Ministry of Defence. 
Pakistan could become the next host for a Chinese base, accord-
ing to a forecast by the South China Morning Post in early 2018. 
In colonial times, military and political subjugation often followed 
in the footsteps of the commercial companies. At least so far, Chi-
na’s economic power does not need cannon boats to drive its ex-
pansion and open doors to trade and investment. But according 
to some observers, this could change in the future if China sees 
its supply routes and investment endangered.
1 COSCO acts as the main logistics partner for the Chinese Navy in 
commercial ports in the Indian Ocean; shipyards in China are allegedly 
instructed to build container ships so that they can serve as supply ves-
sels as well (Putten/Meijnders 2015).

8. Tensions in South Asia
As in Central Asia, China is using the new Silk Roads to penetrate 
a region that is regarded as its sphere of influence by another he-
gemonic power that is militarily highly developed  and equipped 
with nuclear weapons as well. But unlike Vladimir Putin, India's 
Prime Minister Narendra Modi demonstratively remained absent 
from to the Silk Summit in May 2017 in Beijing despite an invi-
tation. Even before the summit, he had complained that Beijing's 
initiative would "undermine the sovereignty of other nations," 
suggesting that the principle of non-interference is only a façade. 
He thus stylized India as a representative of the rights of devel-
oping and emerging countries. The former Indian Ambassador 
to Pakistan, G. Parthasarathy, warned of geopolitical and mili-
tary implications by referring to India’s "strategic containment". 
Behind this clear and widespread rejection are historically based 
mistrust, cultural and political antagonisms, and feelings of eco-
nomic inferiority. This complex situation makes cooperation un-
der B&R’s umbrella almost impossible and makes India a danger-
ous stumbling block for the megaproject.
Brothers become opponents
Until the early 1960s, India and China as leading members of the 
Non-Aligned Movement were close allies in the postcolonial world 
order. But the slogan "Hindi Chini Bhai Bhai", which invokes "broth-
erhood", has long been a thing of the past. The friendship came to 
an abrupt end in the autumn of 1962, when the Chinese People's 
Army advanced into disputed areas in the Himalayas and India's 
military suffered a disgraceful defeat that is still unforgotten today. 
Since then, troops from both sides  in the eastern and western Him-
alayas in the difficult to access mountain regions have faced each 
other within sight. Again and again there are skirmishes like in the 
summer of 2017 in Doklam in the tri-border region with Bhutan. 
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According to the motto, "The enemy of my enemy is my friend", 
China has been supporting Pakistan ever since. Since the divi-
sion of the sub-continent at the end of the British colonial era, 
which was accompanied by mass expulsions and massacres on 
both sides, India has waged war with its neighbour several times, 
ignited by mutual claims to the northwestern Kashmir region. Pa-
kistan received Chinese assistance in establishing its defense in-
dustry, missile technology and army, as well as its nuclear pro-
gramme (Hussain 2017). The Karakorum Highway, completed in 
1960, was a first milestone in the transport links between the two 
countries. Pakistan is valuable to China not only because of its ge-
ostrategic position at the entrance to the Persian Arabian Gulf, but 
also as a potential ally in the Islamic world. During his first state 
visit to Islamabad in April 2015, Xi Jinping declared, "I feel as if I 
am visiting my own brother." Instead of the brotherhood with In-
dia it is now called "Long live the Pakistani-Chinese friendship". 
At the same time, the economic power ratio also changed: When 
India became independent in 1947, it was far ahead of China, 
which had been devastated by the Second World War and civil 
war, but today it is far behind in most economic and social indi-
cators. After four decades of an internally oriented development 
and industrialization strategy, closely linked to the Soviet Union 
both economically and militarily, a rapid economic liberalization 
began in the early 1990s. India imitated elements of the Chinese 
development model such as special economic zones, large infra-
structure projects and attracting foreign investors, most recently 
with ambitious announcements such as Prime Minister Modi's 
"Make in India" project. However, it lacks the steering capabili-
ties of Chinese state capitalism. At the same time, the "Look East 
Policy", which was updated under Modi to the “Act-East” call gave 
rise to a stronger economic and foreign policy orientation towards 
Southeast Asia. Access to the booming markets in the ASEAN re-
gion was just as important as the desire not to leave the field to 
rival China. 
95
Regional infrastructure arms race
One of the reasons for the vehement rejection of B&R in India is 
that Pakistan is now one of its most important partners. The fact 
that the economic corridor between Xinjiang and the port city 
of Gwadar runs through the Gilgit-Baltistan region in the Paki-
stani-controlled part of Kashmir additionally rubs salt into the 
wounds. But even in the other three cardinal points, China's ap-
proach seems less geared to cooperation with India than on woo-
ing away neighbours and partners who are members of the In-
dia-dominated  Southeast Asian Economic Community SAARC. 
In the North, China has now extended the railway line via Tibet's 
capital Lhasa to Xigaze, close to the Nepalese border. Nepal sees 
its membership in the B&R project as an opportunity to ease its 
previous dependence on India. The small, poor inland country 
would become the link between its two powerful neighbours and 
would then be directly connected to Southeast Asia, Central Asia 
and even Europe. With the new communist government, which 
was elected end of 2017, Beijing has a strong ally to drive infra-
structure development. 
In the South Chinese investors have firmly established them-
selves in Sri Lanka, with which India has had close economic and 
political ties for decades. With investments in housing and plan-
tations, Chinese companies are further expanding their position 
and competing with Indian projects. In the East, the Bangladeshi 
government hopes that closer cooperation with China will boost 
the implementation of its ambitious programme to rise to the 
ranks of middle-income countries by 2021. So far depending on 
its big neighbour India, the government wants to create new lee-
way through intensive contacts to the East. This look at the map 
of the Silk Roads in South Asia makes it understandable to speak 
of encirclement and strategic containment in India. 
New Delhi tries to counter this with its own infrastructure 
plans. The project "Mausam" (monsoon), which Narendra Modi 
presented in September 2014, is intended to revive historical trade 
relations in the Indian Ocean and was quickly praised by the ma-
gazine The Diplomat as the "most signifikant foreign policy initia-
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tive designed to counter China". Indian investors’ applications for 
the expansion of the ports of Trincomalee in Sri Lanka and Sittwe 
in Myanmar could lead to the creation of India’s own “Necklace 
of pearls” of ports. The Andaman and Nicobar archipelago, which 
has been an important nature reserve and retreat for indigenous 
peoples, would become a investment and trade zone. The port of 
Chabahar in Iran, less than 100 kilometers west of Gwadar, is in-
tended to serve as a hub for a long-planned North-South Trans-
port Corridor, which would give India access to raw materials 
and markets in Iran, Russia and the Caucasus region, bypassing 
Pakistan. A special economic zone is to attract Indian investors. 
However, India can not keep up with the Chinese billion-Dollar 
loans, construction companies with experience in large-scale pro-
jects and globally operating port operators and shipping compa-
nies, especially as it itself has a considerable backlog in infrastruc-
ture development. In this unequal struggle "India might appear 
to be the biggest loser" (Wagner 2017: 4). That is why it is looking 
for allies. With a "strategic and global partnership," India and Ja-
pan want to unleash the "untapped potential of Asia's two largest 
democracies" and offer countries in the region alternatives to co-
operation with China. A growth corridor between Asia and Af-
rica should counter China's Silk Road involvement in East Africa. 
And - symbolically highly significant - not Chinese but Japanese 
companies were awarded the contract for India's first high-speed 
railway line between Mumbai and Ahmedabad.
Gaps in the economic corridor
The only major B&R project to date in which Indian participation 
was offered and which is roughly oriented to the course of the his-
toric Southern Silk Road is the BCIM economic corridor1 from 
Kunming, the capital of the Chinese province of Yunnan, through 
Myanmar and Bangladesh to the Indian metropolis of Kolkata in 
1 Named after the participating countries Bangladesh, China, India 
and Myanmar.
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West Bengal. The first section between Kunming and Ruili on the 
border with Myanmar has already been expanded to four lanes. 
But behind the border post the problems begin. More challenging 
than the inaccessible terrain of the rugged mountain regions are 
the economic and political reservations against the corridor that 
limit China's diplomatic strategies and financial incentive policy.  
Geo-strategically, Myanmar is important for China's direct ac-
cess to the Indian Ocean. Until its economic and political opening 
2011, Beijing was the most important pillar of the former military 
government. The Shwe natural gas project in the Bay of Bengal 
and the oil and gas pipelines between Kyaukpyu and Yunnan, 
with which China reduces its dependency on transports through 
the Strait of Malacca, have been constructed during this time. 
The plans for the expansion of the port at Kyaukpyu plus indus-
trial park and huge urban development project, the implemen-
tation and operation of which were transferred to a consortium 
led by the Chinese state-owned financial and investment com-
pany CITIC for a period of 50 years, also date from this period.2 
But the new civil government prefers to seek investors and sup-
port from Western countries and institutions and Japan. Trade 
with China is declining, as are Chinese investments. Large pro-
jects such as the Myitsone Dam are on hold after local protests and 
conflicts with the government. The Kyaukpyu Special Economic 
Zone is hardly progressing. Concerns are widespread that the pro-
ject is too large and too expensive, that it will drive up debt, bring 
hardly any employment and industrial growth, and ignores the 
need for agricultural development, on which the majority of the 
population depends. As if in a burning glass, widespread popular 
resentments about China's influence and development visions are 
gathering here. It is said that the government wants to reconsider 
the contract for the construction of the deep-sea port of Kyaukpyu. 
The Indian section of the corridor is also being slowed down. 
2 It is also being suspected that there are linkes between these large 
projects and the persecution and expulsion of the Muslim Rohingya, 
which take place in Rakhine State, where Kyaukpyu is located. (see 
f.ex Ashrafuzzaman Khan, The strategic importance of Rakhine State. 
Straits Time, 3 September 2018)
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The planned connection would actually have advantages for the 
north-eastern Indian states like Arunachal Pradesh, Nagaland, 
Mizoram or Tripura. So far, they have only been connected to the 
rest of the country by a narrow strip of land in the north of Bang-
ladesh ("chicken neck"). The isolated location and long-standing 
armed conflicts have so far hampered development. New trans-
port links would turn the region from a dead end into a bridge 
between India, China and Southeast Asia. But instead of coop-
erating with B&R, the Indian central government prefers to de-
sign its own infrastructure projects, as in the West. A "Trilateral 
expressway" through Myanmar is planned as a connection be-
tween the north-eastern states and Thailand, another one to the 
port of Sittwe in Myanmar and thus to the sea, both without Chi-
nese aid. The only tangible result of numerous rounds of negoti-
ations about a common economic corridor is the car rally K2K on 
the approximately 3,000-kilometer route between Kunming and 
Kolkata, initiated in 2013 by Indian industrialists under the Silk 
Road slogan "Establish ties, promote friendships".
Hopes for a new friendship
With K2K rally, Indian companies demonstrated that they have 
a positive attitude towards the offers of the Silk Road Initia-
tive. They expect closer cooperation with China in infrastruc-
ture development in the difficult, remote area to facilitate trade, 
the extraction of gas, coal, bauxite, copper and wood in the re-
source-rich region and the expansion of  hydropower. India also 
needs closer economic cooperation in order to achieve a similar 
rise to that of China. Economic liberalization had led to higher 
growth rates and foreign investment, but not to broad economic 
diversification or international competitiveness, apart from ar-
eas such as information technology, pharmaceuticals and steel. 
In 2016, China's gross domestic product was five times higher 
than that of India, with nearly the same population. On the In-
dian side, there is a trade balance deficit of almost $ 52 billion. 
And Chinese investors have so far ranked at best in the midfield. 
99
The considerable need to expand infrastructure both in India it-
self and in the region also suggest cooperation instead of an un-
equal arms race. There are proposals to coordinate Modi's light-
house project "Mausam" with the Maritime Silk Road; Gwadar in 
Pakistan and Chabahar in Iran could become sister ports. China 
and India are already working together in the South-South coop-
eration of the BRICS countries. Like Pakistan, India is a founding 
member of the new Asian Investment bank AIIB and even the sec-
ond largest shareholder. Both were admitted to the Shanghai Co-
operation Organisation in 2017 at the recommendation of Russia, 
which China and some Central Asian member countries would like 
to develop into an economic alliance. Optimists on both sides of 
the Indian-Pakistani border therefore consider it conveivable that 
China and the Silk Road Initiative could defuse regional conflicts.3 
In contrast to Russia, Beijing has not yet succeeded in combining 
the recognition of hegemonic self-interest of India with a fragile 
integration into B&R. For the time being, the mistrust that China 
is pursuing not goals other than just noble and partnership-based 
ones overshadows the potential advantages of cooperation. Furt-
hermore, there is widespread fear that India will lose its soverei-
gnty, its autonomy to act and its economic and political indepen-
dence, not to mention the threat of a new military conflict zone 
emerging in the Indian Ocean.
3 Scientists at the Centre for International Peace and Stability in Pa-
kistan's Islamabad see "China in an influential position to change eco-
nomic relations between Pakistan and India." In the Indian Hindustan 
Times (31 March, 2017), Sushil Aaron warns the Hindu fundamentalist 
government in New Delhi that "a tough stance towards Pakistan may 
be good domestic policy for the BJP, but it is not the geopolitics India 
needs". Similarly, Christian Wagner of the Stiftung Wissenschaft und 
Politik (SWP) sees the numerous infrastructure projects in which the 
countries of the region work together in changing constellations and 
partly in new alliances as "probably most important factor that could in 
the long term create a new political geography in South Asia" and thus 
a scenario "in which even a settlement of the Kashmir conflict appears 
possible in the long term" (SWP aktuell 4/2016).

9. A bridge to Africa
China in Africa
Since the end of the colonial era, China has always played the role 
of an alternative and complement to the dominance of Western 
donors for Africa’s governments, especially for the former colo-
nial powers, which regard the continent as a European develop-
ment and economic area. A lighthouse project of recent history 
and a lingering symbol of Communist China’s support for the in-
dependence of African countries was the 2000 kilometre long 
Tanzania Zambia Railway line (Tazara), which began operating 
in 1976. It connects the Tanzanian port of Dar es Salaam with the 
copper mines of Zambia in Southern Africa, and helped to reduce 
dependence on the apartheid regimes in Rhodesia (now Zimba-
bwe) and South Africa. 
In the following decades, generous loans and development 
funds continued to flow into the expansion of the infrastructure. 
Predominantly Chinese construction companies, often state-
owned enterprises, built roads and railway lines, ports and air-
ports - often with Chinese workers - but also hospitals and schools, 
government buildings and stadiums. "China is filling a gap that 
arises because the private market does a poor job of financing 
long-term infrastructure investments and the existing developing 
banks lack the financing and flexibility to meet the growing infra-
structure needs," says former World Bank Director David Dollar.1 
In the course of the "Going global" strategy, and attracted by 
Africa's resource wealth, corporations from China rivalled the 
western hegemony in the plunder. With financing concepts such 
as the "Angola Model", in which the loan is paid off with crude oil, 
Western donors were outdone and Chinese companies brought 
into business. With countries such as Angola and Sudan, Africa 
1 Beijing thus simultaneously mobilised political support for its "One 
China" policy and the international isolation of Taiwan.
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became the second largest supplier of crude oil after the Middle 
East. South African economist Greg Mills comments: "Chinese 
contractors and businesses are willing to go to places and work 
in conditions that few in the West would contemplate". 
In the top group of African recipients of loans from China, 
which the China Africa Research Initiative (CARI) research pro-
ject estimates at $ 86 billion between 2000 to 2014, are the re-
source-rich countries Angola, Democratic Republic Congo and 
Sudan, followed by Ethiopia and Kenya.  Already in 2009 China 
overtook the US as Africa’s largest trading partner, and by 2014 
the trade volume had risen to $ 210 billion. In return for raw ma-
terials such as oil, iron ore and minerals, Africa became a market 
for cheap consumer goods. Chinese traders can be found in the 
smallest market towns, many Chinese contract workers remained 
and set up businesses, from services to construction companies, 
trade to agriculture with their savings.2
Image problems 
But extractivism, infrastructure and trade, as well as Western 
approaches to development, did not provide the impetus for an 
economic structural change away from the role of a supplier of 
raw materials and agricultural products. On the contrary: Cheap 
consumer goods imports competed with the existing branches 
of the processing industry, such as the domestic textile industry, 
and jobs were lost. Approaches to diversify the economy and de-
velop new export markets were blocked. At best, a few economi-
cally stronger countries benefited from China's grants. 
2 Following the dramatic, in part speculative price increases for sta-
ple foods in 2007/2008, Chinese companies briefly tried their hand as 
agricultural investors in Africa. However, many declarations of intent 
were not honored, preliminary contracts were not implemented and 
some major projects failed, so China ranks far behind the United States 
and Great Britain in land grabbing in Africa. Instead, it tends to cover 
its demand for agricultural products in its immediate vicinity in South-
east Asia, Australia and New Zealand, or in the US and Latin America.
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The social, economic and environmental problems caused by 
Chinese companies also damaged China’s image. Many investors 
had difficulties implementing their projects under African condi-
tions. It is especially the numerous small and medium-sized pri-
vate companies that are often looking for quick profits and care 
little about government regulations and rules or the living condi-
tions of the local populations. When Chinese executives in Zam-
bia shot protesting workers in a coal mine, it triggered massive 
anti-Chinese resentments and demonstrations. In addition, there 
were concerns about the threat of dependence on the overpower-
ing partner, complaints about too few jobs for the local population 
and accusations of racism. In several countries, governments shut 
down construction sites of Chinese companies and terminated 
contracts. This even affected flagship projects on the Maritime 
Silk Road such as the modernisation of the port of Bagamoyo in 
Tanzania, which was stopped in 2016 following corruption alle-
gations and financing problems by the Tanzanian government. 
These problems are reflected in the fact that economic relations 
between Africa and China have deteriorated in recent years. Ac-
cording to official figures from the Chinese Ministry of Economy, 
MOFCOM, Chinese investment fell from $ 3.4 billion in 2013 to $ 
2.4 billion in 2016. With the diversification of its supply sources 
in Central Asia and Russia, Africa's importance as a raw material 
supplier to China is declining. Imports and exports collapsed in 
2016, the trade volume fell from $ 150 billion to $ 88 billion ac-
cording to the CARI research institute. Only the seemingly inde-
structible infrastructure sector continued to boom: According to 
estimates by Africa expert Thierry Pairault, the turnover of Chi-
nese construction companies in 2016 was 25 times higher than 
Chinese investment in Africa.3
3 In a February 2018 blog post „China in Africa: Much Ado about In-
vestment“ for CARI, the research director of the French Center National 
de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS) analyses the current assumptions 
about Chinese investment in Africa, with the result that their signifi-
cance is far less than many observers would assume.
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Restart with Xi Jinping 
Xi Jinping's assumption of office marks the beginning of a reori-
entation of China's Africa policy: the new key terms for China's 
economic plans in Africa are "industrial capacity cooperation" 
and "strategic complementarity" (Sun Yun 2014). A cornerstone 
for turning away from a strategy, that had earned China the ac-
cusation of exploiting the continent for mining, land grabbing 
and the sale of cheap consumer goods4, was laid more than fif-
teen years ago with the founding of the Forum on China-Africa 
Cooperation (FOCAC), which covers almost all African countries. 
With infrastructure development, cooperation in trade, technol-
ogy, media, agriculture and culture, it already resembles B&R. To 
African governments, it offers a comprehensive development al-
ternative to their previous close relations with Western countries 
and to the Economic Partnership Agreements, which are unpop-
ular in many countries, with which the European Union wants to 
achieve a further opening for investors from Europe. 
After the Forum for Sino-African cooperation had been bogged 
down for a long time, Xi Jinping sent a signal of departure at the 
6th FOCAC Summit in Johannesburg, South Africa, in December 
2015: He announced a tripling of financial resources to $ 60 bil-
lion for the implementation of an Action Plan, which is intended 
to intensify cooperation at all levels.5 A common denominator for 
a convergence of interests between China's further development 
into a modern global industrial nation ("Made in China 2015") 
and Africa's desire for industrialisation and modernisation is the 
4 From a Western perspective, this contradictory role offered ample 
scope for attack, motivated by an interest in upgrading one's own con-
cepts, which in many respects differed little from Chinese politics, se-
curing privileged access to governments and resources, and devaluing 
Chinese competition. The media and development experts complained 
that "positive European development approaches with a focus on human 
rights and democratisation would be undermined" (Dethlefsen 2017).
5 In the euphoria over the initiative, the wishes also grew: the former 
chairwoman of the African Union, Nkosazana Dlamini Zuma, dreamt of 
high-speed trains between all African countries (Breuer 2017). 
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relocation of labour-intensive industries to Africa and the export 
of overcapacities. 
While Chinese companies are involved in numerous port pro-
jects around Africa and the expansion of railway lines and eco-
nomic corridors into the interior of the continent (Breuer 2017)6, 
the focus of Chinese interest is now on East Africa, which offers 
a direct connection to the maritime Silk Road. It "thus acts as a 
bridge linking railways in Asia to those in Africa" (Putten/Mei-
jnders 2015: 28). Here, too, prestigious infrastructure projects 
play a role as door opener: the link between the Kenyan port city 
of Mombasa and the capital Nairobi, which was completed in re-
cord time, is to be extended to Uganda, Rwanda, the DR Congo 
and Ethiopia. The line opened in October 2016 between Djibouti 
and the Ethiopian capital Addis Ababa improves access to the Red 
Sea for the landlocked country. In the Ethiopian capital, Chinese 
money was used to finance the new light rail system, a system of 
ring roads, and the monumental new headquarters of the African 
Union (AU), the coalition of African governments towering over 
the city. Reports, that this symbol of African unity was hacked 
and information transferred to China were met with silence from 
African governments and denied by Beijing.
6 Economic corridors are part of the efforts of numerous industri-
alised countries and international financial institutions to integrate en-
tire regions around the world into global production and value chains. 
In Africa, over 30 mega-corridors have been initiated by various actors, 
many with the aim of extracting mineral resources and cultivating ag-
ricultural products, such as for example in Zambia's copper belt, in the 
Katanga province of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, in Mozam-
bique, Botswana, Ghana, Liberia and Sierra Leone (Hildyard / Sol 2017). 
An example of this are agricultural growth corridors such as SAGCOT 
in Tanzania, with which the New Alliance for Food Security and Nutri-
tion of the seven most important Western industrialised countries (G7), 
launched in 2012 aims to win global agricultural groups through infra-
structure expansion and institutional and legal reforms in order to make 
Africa a global agricultural exporter - an initiative that poses an exis-
tential threat to farming in Africa.
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African Renaissance 
This reorientation met with a particularly positive response from 
the Ethiopian government. Prime Minister Hailemariam De-
salegn, alongside Kenya's President Uhuru Kenyatta the second 
high-ranking state guest from Africa at the B&R Forum in Bei-
jing in May 2017, said, "We continue to view China as a success-
ful economic model and reliable ally in the fight against poverty 
and in the quest for prosperity." With B&R, China would offer a 
mutually beneficial approach to economic cooperation and Ethi-
opia would be ready to become part of this vision. 
Ethiopia's government has been pursuing an ambitious devel-
opment programme for years and sees itself as a pioneer of an "Af-
rican renaissance". Large dams for power generation and irrigated 
agriculture are being built on the upper reaches of the Nile, and 
large and generous land concessions have been awarded to for-
eign agricultural investors. Due to its geostrategic location, the 
populous country has been given generous consideration by in-
ternational development institutions and Western donors in re-
cent years. But it is also increasingly taking advantage of offers 
from Beijing and attracting Chinese investors. Thanks to its inves-
tor-friendly attitude, low labour costs and a large domestic mar-
ket, the country has experienced an economic upswing. 
One of the pillars, apart from the expansion of the energy sec-
tor and the attempt to establish an export-oriented agriculture, 
is the promotion of a processing industry. MOFCOM, which is 
responsible for foreign trade, economic cooperation and foreign 
investment, selected Ethiopia as a prime example of the transfer 
of the Chinese model of market economy, liberalisation and de-
velopment state (Nicolas 2017). According to official figures, the 
country is now one of the largest recipients of Chinese direct in-
vestment in Africa, behind Nigeria and on a par with South Af-
rica and Zambia. Ethiopia is also an attractive location because 
of its largely free market access to Europe and the USA. The in-
creasing number of Chinese companies relocating their produc-
tion here already makes it the "next China" for some observers. 
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In addition, special economic zones (SEZs) based on the Chi-
nese model play a key role (Brautigam/Tang 2011).7 At the Hua-
jian shoe factory, which produces brands like Tommy Hilfiger and 
Guess, the 3500 workers learn capitalist work routines and Chi-
nese drill: "We give all our strength for production," the chief fore-
man conjures at the morning roll call. The factory is the flagship 
of the Eastern Industrial Zone in Dukem, 40 kilometres east of 
Addis Ababa. In 2011, it was recognised by the Chinese Ministry 
of Commerce MOFCOM as one of China's flagship SEZs abroad, 
entitling it to generous subsidies from Beijing. They are comple-
mented by extensive tax exemptions by the Ethiopian govern-
ment. More than 30 companies with 15,000 employees now op-
erate here. 
Numerous other industrial parks are planned. The Huajian 
business group was awarded the contract to establish its own 
special economic zone, the Huajian International Light Indus-
try City on the outskirts of Addis Ababa. With an investment vol-
ume of $ 2 billion, a yield of $ 4 billion is to be generated here in 
ten years and 100,000 jobs created as well as apartments, hospi-
tals and schools are to be built. The aim is to turn Ethiopia into 
an international manufacturing centre for footwear and light in-
dustry manufacturing and to earn foreign currency with exports 
in order to repay the billion-dollar loans.
 
Just a branch line? 
Much of it, however, is a flowering dream. Although companies 
from other countries, such as Turkey, are now also producing in 
Ethiopia, manufactured products account for only a small share 
of exports. The expansion of industrial parks and special eco-
nomic zones also contributed to land disputes, which were vi-
olently suppressed and led to domestic political crises and the 
7 Further SEZs based on the Chinese model are to be built in Zambia, 
Mauritius, Egypt, Algeria and Nigeria. But most of the planned SEZs had 
considerable start-up difficulties (Brautigam/Tang 2011: 50).
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imposition of a state of emergency. In neighbouring Kenya, too, 
there was fierce civil society resistance to the modernization of 
the railway line between Mombasa and Nairobi, some of which 
runs through a national park. 
Apart from East Africa, where a start was made in Ethiopia, the 
reorientation of China's Africa policy is in its infancy. It remains 
unclear how important the African branch of the maritime Silk 
Road really is. In the FOCAC Action Plan it is only mentioned in 
a subordinate clause. Information about which countries, which 
projects, which ports, which transport links really belong to them 
are vague and contradictory. Compared to the neighbourhood pol-
icy in Central Asia and Southeast Asia, B&R’s activities in Africa 
are low. According to the Xinhua News Agency, by autumn 2018 
only just under ten countries had signed cooperation agreements, 
including Kenya, Ethiopia, Egypt and South Africa. This creates 
the impression that "Africa remains marginalized in the initiative" 
(Nallet 2017). A touchstone will be the FOCAC summit in Beijing 
in September 2018.8 With this in mind, China's Ambassador to 
Nigeria hoped that "the joint construction of the Belt and Road 
between China and Africa will provide a fresh and strong impe-
tus for mutually beneficial cooperation, taking it to a new level".
8 At the summit, President Xi Jinping announced another $ 60 bil-
lion in loans, development aid and investments for three years to the de-
velopment plan, and renewed his commitment that China will not inter-
fere in internal affair.
10. Investors on the Balkan route
For most people in Europe, the Silk Road Initiative seems to be a 
distant event, through which China in the worst case will shake 
up its neighbouring regions economically and politically. The fact 
that Europe itself lies at the crossroads of these is only slowly be-
coming apparent. It is well known that Duisburg is one of the im-
portant inland ports on the trans-Eurasian land route. Perhaps 
Piraeus is even better known as a lesson for the expansion of the 
maritime Silk Road. The spectacular takeovers of European com-
panies in key industries by Chinese investors are also a cause for 
concern. But China is also using the cracks in European politics 
to gain an economic and political foothold and to influence the 
course set in Europe.
Gateway to Europe
Not far from where the ancient Greeks once stopped the advance of 
the Persians in the naval battle of Salamis, Piraeus is now "China's 
gateway to Europe". With an increasing number of container ships, 
Piraeus is becoming the most important European port for China. 
"Our goal is to help Piraeus Port become the largest container 
hub in Europe," said Xu Lirong, chairman of the state-owned 
China Ocean Shipping Company (COSCO).1 Operating modern 
harbors is now more profitable than cargo shipping, where com-
petition and overcapacity, as with airlines, are depressing prices. 
Although COSCO came to Piraeus ten years ago, the EU's re-
quirements to sell public companies to private investors acted 
like a turbo that in 2015 was only briefly slowed down by the 
1 COSCO is owned by the State Assets Supervision and Administra-
tion Commission of the State Council (SASAC), which is part of the cen-
tral government and thus under the control of the Communist Party, 
which also directly controls COSCO directly by appointing senior ma-
nagement. See van der Putten 2016: 16.
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temporary opposition of the Syriza government and trade un-
ions to privatisation. The expansion of the Suez Canal in August 
2015, involving Chinese companies, accelerated the rise to be-
come the fastest growing container port in the world. The cranes 
came from China, as did the building materials. Wages at CO-
SCO are lower than those for organised dockworkers. The close 
business relations between Greek shipowners and China were 
probably also helpful for the negotiations between the Greek 
government and COSCO. They have a large part of their ships, 
financed with loans from Chinese banks, built at shipyards 
there and charter them out to Chinese shipping companies. 
Their majority shareholding in the Piraeus Port Authority, a 
billion-dollar budget and a long-term management agreement 
give COSCO scope for further expansion. In addition to the con-
tainer terminal, the Group also controls the ferry port, the moor-
ings for the cruise ships, car loading, shipyards and estates ad-
jacent to the port. Further berths for yachts and cruise ships, 
hotels and shopping centres are planned. Additional flights con-
nections shall increase the number of Chinese tourists. At the 
same time, COSCO is expanding its presence in numerous other 
ports around the Mediterranean. "What the COSCO investments 
drives illustrate, is the systematic, strategically driven construc-
tion of sector-specific portfolios and linking up their assets 
across a larger region, i.e. Mediterranean" (Bastian 2017: 14).2 
Meanwhile, numerous large corporations such as the technology 
groups HP, Samsung, Sony, ZTE and Huawei, and the logistics 
company DHL are using the hub and logistics base, as are COS-
CO's strongest global competitors, the major shipping companies 
Moller Maersk and Mediterreranean Shipping Company MSC. 
Piraeus thus carries the message for other aspiring harbours like 
2 The participation of China State Grid in the Greek power grid ope-
rator ADMIE shows a similar approach. As in the maritime sector, com-
panies with shareholdings in the Balkans, Portugal, Italy and Spain se-
cure access to another critical infrastructure in Europe, the electricity 
grid. According to the EBRD report, this strategic approach “contrasts 
with the low level of cross-border grid investments across the EU by Eu-
ropean companies" (Bastian 2017: 11).
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Gwadar in Pakistan or Colombo in Sri Lanka: Economic upturn 
follows port expansion.
Eastern Europe flirts with China
China is also making friends in the Balkans and Eastern Europe. 
Bridges, highways and a planned line for high-speed trains be-
tween the Serbian capital Belgrade and the Hungarian capital Bu-
dapest promise the extension of the maritime Silk Road by land. 
Poland and the Baltic countries are striving to become thriving 
inland ports and industrial sites along the Eurasian land bridge. 
With the prospect of billions in investment3, high-ranking visits 
from China and the opening of Confucius Institutes, banking and 
corporate branches, the region’s politicians will be courted. The 
heads of government of Hungary, Poland and Serbia and the Czech 
President attended the B&R Forum in Beijing. From an Eastern 
European perspective, the prospect of reducing the still existing 
infrastructure gap and accelerating industrialisation makes China 
an attractive competitor to the EU. 
Vice versa, Eastern Europe is a testing ground for B&R’s var-
ious elements (Bastian 2017: 4). One way of doing this is to use 
the division between EU member states and accession can-
didates, between Eastern and Western European countries, 
to generate political loyalty and economic integration. The 
Brexit is also a potential gateway for initiating new alliances 
with the British government and high-ranking politicians.4 
3 In October 2016, the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China 
(ICBC) set up an investment fund of $ 11.5 billion to finance infrastruc-
ture, processing industries and consumer goods in the countries of Cen-
tral and Eastern Europe, which could be increased to $ 56 billion.
4 Former Prime Minister David Cameron has been appointed head of 
the Anglo-China Belt and Road Fund, and the British government wants 
to provide up to £ 25 billion in loans for British companies involved in 
B&R projects in Asia. However, during a visit to China in January 2018, 
Theresa May did not fulfill Beijing’s wish to be the first G7 government 
to officially recognise B&R.
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Authoritarian, national-populist politicians in Eastern Europe 
welcome the fact that, unlike the EU, economic promises are be-
ing offered without regulations and political conditions. Czech 
President Milos Zeman praised cooperation with China as "an 
act of national independence". Viktor Orban proved that he had 
learned the Silk Road rhetoric well: "We look upon the President 
of China’s One Belt One Road Initiative as one of globalisation’s 
new configurations: one which will no longer divide the world into 
teachers and students, but which will provide the basis for mutual 
respect and mutual advantage." According to Kong Tianping, an 
expert for Europe at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, the 
network of eleven Eastern European EU member states extend-
ing to the Baltic States plus five Balkan states and China (CEEC 
16 + 1)5 established in 2012 is one of the government’s most im-
portant diplomatic achievements in Beijing. Its political windfall 
profit became immediately apparent when Hungary, Greece and 
some other governments blocked joint EU declarations on torture 
and human rights in China and on the conflict in the South China 
Sea or rejected stricter controls on Chinese investment in Europe.6 
But compared to the massive investments of Chinese companies 
in Western European core countries such as Germany, France and 
the UK, expectations in Eastern Europe have so far been disap-
pointed. Apart from Piraeus and a few projects such as the takeo-
ver of the Zelezara Smederevo steelworks in Serbia, a bridge over 
the Danube and the extension of a highway in Montenegro by Chi-
nese companies, words and deeds fall far apart, agreements are 
"signifying more rhetoric than substance" (Bastian 2017): 31). In-
vestment and trade are limited to a few economically promising 
countries. Their trade balance with China is often already nega-
tive, which is likely to increase due to the influx of goods via the 
5 Greece only has observer status.
6 At the same time, warnings are becoming louder that, in parallel 
with China's economic penetration across Europe, attempts are increa-
sing to create a pro-Chinese mood by influencing political and econo-
mic elites, the media and public opinion, and civil society and acade-
mia. See, for example, the study “Authoritarian Advance. Responding 
to China's Growing Political Influence in Europe”. Merics 2018, Berlin.
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Silk Roads, as is their debt. The partnership with China is there-
fore not a real alternative to the EU (ebda: 45).
Europe is looking for answers
Until recently, there was the impression that "no European coun-
try, nor the EU, has so far developed a comprehensive strategic 
approach in responding to the impact of OBOR on regional dy-
namics and the way in which European engagement should be 
developed" (Putten/Seamen 2016: 10). While China is in the pro-
cess of controlling important trade routes and not only taking 
over European companies like Kuka7 and Syngenta, but also 
extending its influence over governments, the EU Commission 
seems strangely indecisive and ambivalent. This applies not only 
to China's policy of "divide and rule" in Eastern Europe, but also 
to the potential consequences that B&R has for Europe's own 
economic development: Do the risks of being out-booted by Chi-
nese competition outweigh the chances of profiting from cooper-
ation in Eurasia and closer ties to the Chinese domestic market? 
Some of the answers that have since emerged are to counter the 
temptations of Beijing with their own attractive offers. With the 
Trans European Transport Network, connections in Europe will 
be expanded,  the long-planned transport corridor between Eu-
rope, the Caucasus and Asia (TRACECA) will be accelerated, and a 
European Strategic Investment Fund will stand up to the Chinese 
promises of billions. The EU-China Connectivity Platform, which 
was agreed between the EU Commission and the high-ranking 
Chinese planning authority NDRC, is one approach for coopera-
tion in the expansion of infrastructure. On the European side, this 
promises to influence further developments and help the coun-
7 Chinese acquisitions like Kuka intensified the discussion about 
tighter controls of investments in critical branches and high technol-
ogy. In July 2018 for example, the German government blocked the en-
try of the State Grid Corporation of China (SGCC) into the German 
power market, which intended to buy a 20 per cent share of the grid 
provider 50Hertz. 
114 10. Investors on the Balkan route
tries between China and Europe to seize economic opportunities. 
While China is acting, Europe has set up a working group to de-
velop a new strategy on Central Asia by the end of 2019, and a po-
sition paper on B&R is expected to be published in October 2018. 
At the Silk Road Summit in Beijing, where Western European 
governments from Germany, England and France were demon-
stratively represented only by second- and third-tier politicians, 
Europe showed cohesion. To Beijing’s great disappointment, the 
EU members unanimously refused to sign the final declaration. 
Justification for this was the lack of commitments on key EU 
issues such as transparency, regulations for public tendering8, 
mutual market access and social and environmental standards. 
During the visit of French President Emmanuel Macron to China 
in early 2018, he stated in plain language: "These roads cannot 
be those of a new hegemony, which would transform those that 
they cross into vassals." Such clear statements are part of a grow-
ing international backlash. In the United States, Australia, Japan 
and India, too, growing mistrust is forging alliances against Chi-
na's new globalisation. Nonetheless, researcher Frans-Paul van 
der Putten said that China's approach to strengthening its global 
positions is still much more comprehensive and effective than 
Europe's approach.
Uneasiness in the Mediterranean
Despite its outspoken commitment to Piraeus, COSCO is also 
interested in the Turkish container terminal Kumport on the 
north coast of the Marmara Sea near Istanbul, which is stra-
tegically located at the entrance to the Black Sea. Ankara's re-
treat from Europe and the US, and the goal of restoring the 
former influence of the Ottoman Empire fit well with China's 
drive towards the West. In 2015, the two governments signed 
8  The railway line between Belgrade and Budapest has been the 
subject of an investigation procedure as to whether it infringes the pub-
lic procurement rules.
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an agreement on the extension of the rail link from Kars in 
Eastern Turkey to Edirne shortly before the border to Greece 
and Bulgaria. Together with the recently completed Baku-Tbi-
lisi-Kars (BTK) connection from Azerbaijan on the Caspian 
Sea and the Georgian capital Tbilisi to Kars, an alternative Silk 
Road route is being created that bypasses both Russia and Iran. 
As in the Indian Ocean, Chinese activities contributed that the 
“Mediterranean has changed from a sea of tranquillity to a ma-
jor and central security concern of most (if not all) great powers" 
(Peter van Ham in: Putten 2016: 6) will become a new geopolitical 
hotspot. Russia, too, is trying to expand its position in the east-
ern Mediterranean region. But most of these geopolitical scenar-
ios are still dreams of the future. The partnership between Tur-
key and China has also been adversely affected by the fact that 
Turkey sees itself as an advocate of the Turkmen Uighurs in the 
western Chinese province of Xinjiang. In 2009, Prime Minister 
Erdogan described the repression there as "a form of genocide", 
a remark he later withdrew.
Bulgarian Eastern Europe expert Yanko Yordanov (2015) in-
terprets China's involvement in the Eastern Mediterranean as a 
long-term political investment to prepare for future strategic chal-
lenges. This complements measures such as the B&R alliances in 
Central Asia or Southeast Asia, with which Beijing is respond-
ing to the US’s attempts to contain the region. Their geopoliti-
cal relevance will also depend on how China's relations with the 
EU, Russia and the US and Japan in the Far East continue to de-
velop. Applied to the global Go game: China is building a geopo-
litical "sleeper" at the explosive interface between Western and 
Eastern Europe, the Near and Middle East and Asia, which can 
be used if necessary.
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Frans-Paul van der Putten
"The Silk Roads should be a joint project"
Uwe Hoering: Does Europe have reason to fear the new Silk 
Roads? Or are they less threatening than some observers claim?
Frans-Paul van der Putten:  BRI is helping Europe to get a 
clearer idea of what China’s rise means and to be more focused 
in its response.  
More specifically, will the position of Europe or European com-
panies be weakened by the growing control over resources and 
trade routes and the alternative access to credit, investment and 
development funding that B&R offers to participating govern-
ments?
BRI is a coordinated effort from China to position Chinese ac-
tors in key positions on international transport routes and thus in 
the supply chains of Europe and European companies. Most Chi-
nese companies are either state-owned or the Chinese State and 
the CCP have the potential to influence their strategies and oper-
ations. It seems likely that the Chinese government will use this 
influence over supply chains to further strengthen China´ s eco-
nomic competitiveness and political influence to the detriment of 
foreign counterparts, including Europe.
That sounds like a state-led "attack on Europe". How well is there 
awareness of these possible effects on Europe and its own global 
role?
Awareness overall is still limited in Europe. Some companies 
have very clear ideas about what changes BRI could bring, but they 
focus on their own sector. Governments have a broader view, but 
so far they are far less able to understand, let alone respond to, 
the implications of BRI when compared to companies. 
Especially in Southern and Southeastern Europe, there are some 
countries that are much more positive about B&R than govern-
ments in Western Europe. Could Europe be further divided by 
this?
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The impact of BRI-specific projects within the EU is still lim-
ited. Piraeus is the main instance of an activity that can clearly 
be attributed to BRI and where China is delivering, as Greece can 
become a major transshipment port and potentially a significant 
entry/exit point for trade between the EU and China. The Piraeus 
case also shows what China has to offer that European investors 
would not do. These include the diversion of container ships from 
other Mediterranean ports to Piraeus and the development of 
Chinese cruise tourism. Other examples include the railway ser-
vices between China and European destinations, most notably in 
Poland, the Czech Republic, Germany, Belgium and the Nether-
lands. They need to see for themselves whether they can benefit 
from these new trade routes with China.
Does B&R’s infrastructure development in Eastern Europe and 
Eurasia offer any opportunities for European countries or com-
panies?
There are certainly new opportunities for European companies 
that are active in the logistics industry or exporting to China. For 
companies that offer services or products related to the construc-
tion of new infrastructure, it is difficult to enter China-led proj-
ects. In order to gain a stronger foothold in these markets, they 
need support from the EU and European financial institutions.
So cooperation instead of fears?
The EU-China Connectivity Platform and EU infrastructure 
programs should be used as far as possible together with the BRI 
project to promote new transport between the EU and China that 
benefit the Europe’s neighbours in Eastern Europe, the Balkans, 
the Black Sea region, and Central Asia. This would support BRI, 
but the EU would also have a greater influence on how the new 
Silk Roads develop and could show the countries that are located 
between the EU and China that it is willing to promote oppor-
tunities for their economic development. The EU should engage 
with China and other countries to jointly build the new Silk Road, 
while making the point that this is a common good that should 
not be owned or controlled by a single actor. BRI is a Chinese in-
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itiative, but the new Silk Road can only succeed if it is a multi-
lateral project. In this way, the EU will strengthen the legitimacy 
of BRI and China’s role as a great power. In return, China should 
accept some form of multilateral institutionalisation of the new 
Silk Road in which it plays a significant but not an exclusive role.
It is said that China, unlike Europe, has a global strategy ....
This is difficult to answer because the definition of a strategy is 
not very clear. But I would say that China's approach to strength-
ening its global position is more advanced, comprehensive, for-
ward-looking and effective than Europe's approach.
 
Dr. Frans-Paul van der Putten is a Senior Research Fellow at 
the Clingendael Institute in the Netherlands. He is researching 
the geopolitical significance of China's growing role in interna-
tional politics, especially the contribution of B&R.
11. Contours of a new hegemony
The new Silk Roads are arterial roads for China’s aspirations to 
become a great power again. Opinions are divided as to whether 
this major step forward goes hand in hand with a claim to global 
leadership. For some analysts, China, with its state capitalism and 
growing military presence, is exploring ways to imperial power. 
Other observers, however, believe that the Beijing government 
"is far more interested in securing alternative routes for its en-
ergy imports and in protecting commercial sea lanes than it is in 
building a new empire" (Miller 2017: 171). According to its own 
statements, it does not strive for hegemonic dominance or global 
leadership, but offers a "new type of Great Power relations” with 
the other major powers based on mutual respect and equality.
To find them....
China transports a new globalisation and development model 
of infrastructural connectivity via the Silk Roads. B&R is about 
its positioning in the global competition coagulated in highways 
and harbours, in cement and asphalt. As a multipurpose pro-
ject, B&R is also an attempt at comprehensive crisis manage-
ment and securing political legitimacy internally. At least for the 
time after the crisis of 2007/2008, China has succeeded in gain-
ing hegemony over the discourse about the immediate future of 
globalisation: its own strategy presents itself as a better alterna-
tive to previous globalisation processes with their crises and so-
cial and ecological contradictions and problems. China’s own ex-
pansion is intended to serve the well being of other countries, 
above all to develop economically weaker ones, while the eco-
nomic powerhouse China becomes a partner in a global "com-
munity of fate". This development mission is a counter-model 
to failed post-colonial Western development concepts for Africa 
and Asia and at the same time builds up economic and politi-
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cal countervailing structures and power to the Western liberal 
model of bourgeois democracy and international governance. 
Geo-strategically, B&R is reminiscent of the Asian Go game. Key 
positions, rooms and corridors are occupied by infrastructure 
projects and investments, flanked and secured by loans. In this 
way, various strategies are linked and tied together like build-
ing blocks and exaggerated by political and ideological narra-
tives. Above all, the great narrative of the "rebirth", the over-
coming of the historical "humiliation" and the restoration of 
China's greatness floats as nationalist legitimisation and mis-
sion over the whole Grand Plan, personified and iconized 
in figures like Admiral Zheng He of the historic Silk Roads. 
Especially for economically weak states in Africa and Asia and 
Eastern Europe, this offer is highly attractive. They hope for an 
expansion of trade and employment and a comprehensive growth 
spurt through deeper integration into the world economy. The 
pragmatically applied principle of political non-interference in 
the internal affairs of a state is, in their view, a clear advantage 
over Western concepts; indeed, it appears to be a liberating blow 
with which they can advance decolonization and strengthen sov-
ereignty. The proclaimed recognition of national sovereignty is at-
tractive not only to authoritarian governments and despotic politi-
cal elites who care little about human rights, but especially for them. 
Freely based on the motto from "The Lord of the Rings", the initia-
tive has the potential to find them, to bind them all, "built on money 
and held together by hard infrastructure" (Miller 2017: 17). Inte-
gration also takes place through the establishment of new politi-
cal institutions and networks. This creates asymmetric economic 
dependencies and power relations, as well as political loyalties and 
vassal-like relationships. It is becoming increasingly difficult for 
governments to free themselves from this political-economic em-
brace. This has already paid off in support of Chinese positions 
in international disputes by ASEAN member countries, such as 
the conflict in the South China Sea or in the blockade of EU de-
cisions by Eastern European countries in the European Union. 
The close cooperation of the Chinese government with corrupt, 
reactionary and authoritative regimes can be used by them as a 
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stabilising and legitimising factor. This pushes back the predomi-
nance of the Western liberal political model in national and inter-
national regimes. In this way, B&R supports the current tenden-
cies towards de-democratisation, restriction of civil society leeway 
and authoritarianism in many countries and corresponds with the 
authoritarian development in China itself and the power of Xi Jin-
ping. Matthias Stepan even warns in August 2017 in a study for 
the Mercator Institute for China Studies (merics), "China’s po-
litical system will become a global model for aligning the trans-
formative potential of big data technologies with a hard authori-
tarian, perhaps even newly totalitarian, approach to governance".
Potential conflicts
However, the expectations that economic development and the 
co-operation with authoritarian regimes will bring stability to 
China's foreign interests and that B&R will become a virtual per-
petuum motion machine for cooperation, peace and prosperity 
are deceptive. In many countries, B&R activities are met with 
criticism and political opposition, as well as fears of loss of sov-
ereignty. A fundamental distrust of China's intentions, interests 
and interventions is widespread. Protests against low employ-
ment effects and lack of development progress, criticism of the 
business practices of Chinese companies and concerns that the 
Silk Roads might pass by many sections of the population are part 
of everyday life at B&R. However, the criticism of over-indebt-
edness is central. All of this quickly fuels political or economic 
conflicts such as those in Pakistan and Kazakhstan. In Zambia 
and Sri Lanka, resentments against China were used by the op-
position parties and were decisive for the elections. The protests 
against B&R often include criticism of domestic elites, corruption 
and cronyism with Chinese corporations. In addition, regional 
conflicts and militant movements can impair B&R's success. 
Despite its commitment to peaceful cooperation and partnership, 
China's new alliance contains moments of competition with ex-
isting alliances or even division potential. Allies of the US in East 
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Asia, of Russia in Eurasia and India in South Asia are intensively 
courted. B&R also allows for greater control over sea and land 
routes, energy supply and critical infrastructure. By doing so, 
China is expanding its presence in regions that have hitherto been 
influenced by other hegemonic powers and is aggressively compet-
ing with them. On the one hand, the new “marriage of convenience” 
with Russia shows that the integration also works with hegemonic 
powers and that competition can be balanced at least temporarily 
in a division of labour and mutual recognition of the respective 
spheres of influence. On the other hand, countries like India, which 
itself has hegemonic claims in the region, oppose these attempts. 
B&R is thus forging new partnerships on the one hand, and 
strengthening or creating manifold domestic and regional lines 
of conflict on the other. The shifts in power relations and new al-
liances such as those between the authoritarian states of China 
and Russia or between the more democratic governments of In-
dia, the US, Japan and Australia have resulted in new constella-
tions of forces in a multipolar world order. This is not only due 
to the government in Beijing. Through Trump's policy, the US is 
currently "making China big again," William Pesek comments in 
the Nikkei Asian Review of March 19, 2018.
Security architecture
It is not only in Pakistan that Chinese projects have been attacked 
several times. Railway lines can be interrupted, pipelines blown 
up and supply chains affected. To protect Chinese projects and 
their staff in the CPEC economic corridor, Pakistan even set up 
a 12,000-strong special unit. Important shipping routes are also 
at the centre of attention of security policy strategists, as they are 
particularly vulnerable at bottlenecks such as the Strait of Malacca 
or the Horn of Africa. Ironically, China's desire to strengthen its 
economy and security of supply with the Silk Roads also makes 
it more vulnerable. The close link between B&R and the leader-
ship position of Xi Jinping and with the stability, security and le-
gitimacy of the state and party in China itself makes it even more 
123
necessary for success to strengthen strategic security elements 
and possibly to come to an inclined level of increasing involve-
ment in conflicts.
In his book "China's Private Army" Alessandro Ardino describes 
the emergence of Chinese paramilitary security services. The US 
company Frontier Services Group of the founder of the infamous 
private security service Blackwater, has set up training camps 
in Yunnan and Xinjiang to train ex-soldiers to "protect Chinese 
corporate and government strategic interests around the world, 
without having to involve the Chinese People’s Liberation Army" 
(cited by Rolland 2017: 169).1 As a consequence, this could become 
a gradual intervention in the internal affairs of other countries. 
Counter-terrorism measures and active mediation in regional 
conflicts are further signs that Beijing is softening its stand on the 
principle of non-interference in favour of a common security archi-
tecture. Wang Yizhou, professor of international politics at Beijing 
University, has already coined the term "creative participation”. 
It is in this context that the People's Liberation Army's rearma-
ment, modernization and, for decades, most fundamental re-
form, the gradual expansion of its presence in other regions 
and its cooperation with other countries such as Kazakhstan 
and Pakistan have been carried out. Since April 2013, the mil-
itary has an explicit mandate to protect China's rights and in-
terests abroad, including energy sources and natural resources, 
in addition to Chinese citizens. So far, China’s rise to a global 
player has focused on economic development, leaving military 
predominance to the US and its allies. For the time being, the 
government continues to rely more on economic and political 
persuasion and diplomacy ("soft power") to promote transna-
tional expansion and the "rebirth of China." So far, it has been 
able to achieve its foreign policy goals by non-military means. 
However, according to Rolland, the influence of B&R on the de-
velopment of the Chinese military should not be underestimated 
1 CITIC, one of China's largest state-owned conglomerates, which has 
announced $ 100 billion for BRI projects, holds a 20 percent share in the 
Hong Kong based organisation.
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(Rolland 2017: 171). Therefore, fears of dual use are obvious, 
namely ports and container ships, railways and roads, commu-
nication systems and high technologies could be used not only 
commercially but also militarily. "In the long term it is possible 
that this will change: China’s diplomatic–commercial approach 
might turn out to be only a stage in a trajectory that eventually in-
volves also the expansion of strategic–military influence, "say the 
China experts Frans-Paul van der Putten and Minke Meijnders 
(2015: 33). The new Silk Roads could create the conditions for this. 
In imperial footsteps?
The question is whether these economic and political power struc-
tures that emerge with B&R, the accelerating militarization and 
the erosion of other global superpowers add up to a "new em-
pire" with the power not only to find and bind them all, but to 
rule them. The answers are largely speculative. Refuge is there-
fore also sought in historical retrospectives. Some observers see 
a resemblance between B&R and the Marshall Plan for the recon-
struction of Europe after the Second World War through which 
the US secured its leading role vis-à-vis the Soviet Union and the 
expansion of the Western economic model.2 
Stefan Schmalz (2015) goes back even further and sees a num-
ber of parallel elements in comparison with the historical ascent 
of Great Britain in the 18th century and the United States after 
the Second World War. Similar to the rise of Great Britain and 
the United States, the internationalisation of Chinese state cap-
italism supports its own position of power through a structure 
of the world market that is oriented towards its self-interest and 
particularly targets (semi)peripheral states. By internationalis-
ing its national currency, the Renminbi, China is attacking the 
dominance of the US dollar as the global reserve currency. In 
2 For a comparison between B&R and Marshall Plan, see for exam-
ple Simon Shen, How China's Belt and Road' Compares to the Marshall 
Plan, in: The Diplomat February 6, 2016.
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addition, China's development into the largest market for con-
sumer goods has "world-historical significance", because the role 
of a " global end consumer" contributed to the United States’ po-
sition as a world power. The "imperial mode of living" (Brand/
Wissen 2018), the consumption and the “moderate prosperity” 
of the Chinese middle classes, has far-reaching global conse-
quences for supply chains and investments, but also on power re-
lations to secure them. The financial news service Bloomberg flip-
pantly formulated this idea: "Chinese consumers rule the world". 
Another building block is the establishment of new multilateral 
institutions that weaken the previous Western-dominated re-
gime (Zhang 2017: 325). These include, for example, the Shang-
hai Cooperation Organization, the Asian Investment Bank 
AIIB and the New Development Bank of the BRICS countries, 
or the free trade agreement RCEP as an Asia-Pacific counterpart 
to TPP excluding the USA. Existing dispute resolution mecha-
nisms between investors and governments such as the ICSID of 
the World Bank, which are based on the legal systems of the US 
and European countries, are countered by the establishment of 
its own arbitration boards in China for the Silk Road Initiative. 
More than twenty years ago, the influential US political scientist 
Zbigniew Brzezinski outlined the vision of a "Trans Eurasian secu-
rity architecture" along a new Silk Road made up of pipeline and 
trade routes, economic concessions, military bases, and pro-West-
ern governed countries (Ritz 2012). It was intended to connect 
large parts of Asia with an enlarged European Union and an ex-
panding NATO - to the exclusion of Russia. Brzezinski's vision 
culminated in a geopolitical coronation imagination: the world 
system based on progressive globalisation would accept the "in-
signia of the current ruler of the world," i.e. the political system 
and the culture of the United States of America. China, too, could 
be integrated into this structure at some point in the future. It is 
an irony of globalisation that it is now the other way round: The 
economic power of China is implementing this idea and rolling 
up Eurasia from the East. Now speculation is rife how China will 
shape the future of globalisation.
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Audacity or hubris
The further rise of China to an equal great power will depend, 
among other things, on the close interaction between the fate of 
B&R and the developments in China itself. Although much bet-
ter prepared and organised than the "Great Leap Forward" in the 
late 1950s, the ambitious initiatives and campaigns could also be 
Xi Jinping's Achilles heel, according to merics director Sebas-
tian Heilmann. Failures and a growing contradiction between an-
nouncements and implementation successes on the ground could 
taint the standing of state and party." What looks like boldness 
today might look like hubris in two decades" (Hillmann 2018: 8). 
The clearer the contours become, the more widespread are the 
sceptical voices pointing to the numerous resistances and im-
ponderables for success, not only abroad. Risks are also being 
discussed in China itself, albeit in view of the initiative’s high po-
litical importance more cautiously (Rolland 2017: 151ff). “Our en-
terprise and Belt and Road Initiative countries will face financial 
difficulties”, said Hu Xiaolian, the chairwomen of the Export-Im-
port Bank of China in June 2018 to The New York Times. Shi Yin-
hong, an internationally renowned scientist and advisor to the 
State Council, publicly warned against "the possibility of over-
stretching strategies and the danger of being drawn into mili-
tary conflicts” in view of the economic commitments entered into. 
It also remains to be seen to what extent the internal structural 
problems that B&R’s modernisation and expansion are to over-
come can actually be resolved quickly. The increase in central gov-
ernment control capacities does not mean an all-encompassing 
control power (Brink/Nölke 2013: 27). Representatives of banks 
and investors, especially from the private sector, cautiously ex-
press concerns about the feasibility and profitability of B&R pro-
jects and the incalculable risks of the huge loans to participating 
countries. In times of globalisation, there are always ways to cir-
cumvent, ignore or even sabotage government requirements. De-
spite its high financial reserves, the over-indebtedness of B&R 
member countries can also become a problem for China. But if the 
economic crisis becomes uncontrollable, the debt situation gets 
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out of hand or serious conflicts arise abroad, Xi Jinping's position 
could be seriously threatened, says Au Loong Yu: "In times of cri-
sis Xi’s personal power will also become a target held responsible 
for all possible failures."
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Au Loong Yu
„Xi cannot eliminate all opposition“
Uwe Hoering: Where do you see the main drivers for B&R: the 
economic crisis, a crisis of legitimacy, or geopolitical ambitions?
Au Loong Yu: I think the answer is “all of the above”, although 
the weighting of each of the three factors is very different from 
each other. The economic crisis and geopolitical objectives are 
much more direct factors. Right now there is no pending economic 
crisis as the state came to the rescue of the stock market sharp fall 
in 2015, just like what it once did in the 2008 crisis. Yet one must 
take note of the fact that the basic problems of these crisis have 
not been fixed at all. Economic crisis refers to the long-term eco-
nomic imbalance brought about by the growth strategy, in which 
an incredibly large part of national income is spent on capital in-
vestment while consumption has been restricted. If we look at the 
share of final consumption in China’s GDP, although it is now a 
bit higher than previous years after the government’s attempt to 
stimulate domestic demand for many years, it still stood at only 
39 per cent in 2016, not only much lower than the world average 
(and also much lower than low income countries), but also sig-
nificantly lower than its own previous record of 48 per cent back 
in 1960. China therefore suffers from a typical economic imbal-
ance of over-accumulation and over-production. Ten years ago, 
the government openly declared that this imbalance should be 
resolved through overseas investment and B&R is another ma-
jor project for this. 
Since China became the second largest source of outbound 
FDI in the world in 2016, it has had significant foreign interests 
to defend, particularly when its investment emphasis was on in-
frastructure and therefore takes a long time to generate profit. 
Therefore, the government ignores the official stated policy of 
non-interference in other countries’ internal affairs and does the 
exact opposite to increase its share in the world market while at 
the same time moving up its status in the global value chain. The 
growing tensions with the US over China’s rise to become an im-
portant global force are also forcing China to strengthen its re-
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lations with other countries, especially in the neighbourhood - 
hence B&R. 
As for legitimacy, the CCP is well aware that since the fall of the 
Berlin Wall, its only ideological weapon in its possession is Great 
Han nationalism. BRI as a project to “Make China great again” will 
undoubtedly help in the CCP‘s attempt to create a new legitimacy. 
Why is the Silk Road narrative so important to the Chinese gov-
ernment?
It helps the Chinese government in two ways, domestically and 
internationally. Historically, China experienced its most glorious 
periods under the Han dynasty and the Tang dynasty, when Chi-
na’s empire was very prosperous and its territory stretched deep 
into Central Asia, hence cultural and economic exchanges be-
tween China and countries west of it reached new heights. Chi-
na’s silk and other products made their way deep into Europe. The 
Silk Road thus promotes pride in the  “Chineseness”. This works 
in favour of the government’s grand project of Chinese national-
ism and a "harmonious society". This is the domestic dimension. 
Secondly, the ancient Silk Road contributed to bringing two of 
the world religions into China: Buddhism and Islam. One of the 
streams evolved into a kind of Buddhism with “Chinese charac-
teristics” – the Zen school. The Silk Road is thus associated with a 
peaceful and friendly cultural exchange between China and other 
nations, which now benefits BRI. 
Will B&R strengthen authoritarian regimes?
In its foreign policy, the Chinese government sometimes pre-
fers authoritarian or conservative governments to left-wing or 
progressive partners because they are less subject to democratic 
control and therefore more likely to allow for secret agreements. 
They are the more convenient companions in trade agreements 
and other forms of cooperation as well. This may be the case for 
China’s friendship with Russia and many Central Asian coun-
tries. Even in Western countries, the CCP occasionally favours 
conservative parties, for example in the UK, if they are less crit-
ical of human rights issues. Previously the Chinese government 
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feared that the British Labour Party might favour more political 
reform in Hong Kong before the return of sovereignty than the 
Conservative Party was willing to carry out. It probably carries 
the same logic in relation to BRI. Those authoritarian countries 
in Central Asia are easy targets for the Chinese government when 
it comes to trade talks etc. In essence B&R is intended to be an 
economic second front in the contest between the US and China 
for global leadership.
But isn’t this fraternisation a long-term risk to success?
At its core, B&R intends to open a second economic front 
in competition with the USA for global leadership. Of course, 
everything has its price. B&R and the need to bribe foreign des-
pots are very expensive, and it is quite possible that China will 
overstretch its reach and therefore suffer a setback. The strong 
connection to despots can also have the opposite effect if it leads 
to protests and reinforces anti-Chinese sentiment and possibly 
even brings an opposition against China to power. Of course, Chi-
nese money is currently working in favour of both the Chinese 
government and authoritarian governments. But the situation is 
constantly changing. 
Is there a new, more aggressive nationalism in China today than 
it used to be?
Yes it is, because it is much more strongly promoted by the 
state. In the Mao era, the official line rejected nationalism, even 
if it was only verbal. It claimed that it was only promoting “patri-
otism”, not nationalism. In Deng’s era, when ideological debates 
were silenced, it was the official policy of the Communist Party 
to "lay low and wait for its chance". The state was therefore very 
cautious about nationalism.  This has changed in the last ten years 
and especially since Xi Jinping took power. Nationalism has be-
come a state led project and is propagated with a lot of money in 
print media, television and films.   
Xi Jinping has closely linked his position and politics with B&R. 
Could it become his Achilles heel if it fails?
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If there is a “Chinese characteristic” in relation to China’s su-
preme leaders, then it is the fact that they all want to have their 
own signature projects, showcase projects linked to their names. 
For Mao, it was the “Great Leap Forward” and the Cultural Rev-
olution. For Xi, who wants to imitate Mao, it is the re-creation of 
the Chinese empire with BRI as his signature project. 
By removing the term limit of Chinese head of state staying in 
power plus installing measures to concentrate all power in his 
hands, allows Xi to rule despotically. But that does not mean there 
are no more countervailing forces. Factions within the party still 
exist and it cannot be ruled out that opposing factions will speak 
out more strongly in the future, especially when the debt moun-
tain becomes unbearable or the economic crisis uncontrollable 
or there is a confrontation with a foreign power. Even Mao could 
not eliminate all factions and stop internal fighting, and after his 
death his work was buried. It is therefore difficult to imagine that 
now Xi, who did nothing great before coming to power, can per-
manently eliminate any opposition in the Party. 
One already hears cautious criticism of B&R that the project 
could prove too ambitious and exceed China's capacities. In for-
eign policy, there are apparently two schools of thought: One ar-
gues that the US should be approached confrontatively, the other 
that China should adapt to US hegemony. These differences of 
opinion will not disappear just because Xi has concentrated power 
on himself. Rather, in times of crisis, his personal power will it-
self become the target and be held responsible for possible failure. 
Au Loong Yu was a founding member of Globalization Moni-
tor in Hong Kong. A few years ago he left the organization and 
works as a publicist. His book "China Rise: Strength and Fragil-
ity" (2012) has been translated into French and Japanese, among 
other languages.
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